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Introduction
On June 26, 1993, the United States launched twenty-three Tomahawk
cruise missiles at the main headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in
downtown Baghdad.' U.S. President Bill Clinton justified the military
action as a legitimate act of self-defense under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, in response to a failed Iraqi attempt to assassinate former
President George Bush.2 Article 51, an exception to the general prohibi-
tion on the use of force in international affairs,3 states in part: "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security."'4 Despite strong sup-
port within the United States and among U.S. allies, critics of the attack
argued that it was an illegal use of force that did not satisfy the require-
ments of self-defense under international law.5
This Note analyzes the legality of the U.S. action in the context of
national self-defense. Part I discusses the general prohibition of the use of
force in international relations, and Part II examines the customary right
of self-defense. Part Ill discusses the limits on national self-defense
imposed by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and presents the debate sur-
rounding the interpretation of those limits. Part IV describes the Iraqi
plot to kill President Bush and the U.S. response. Part V concludes that
the U.S. action was a legitimate use of force in self-defense under both
customary international law and Article 51.
1. The General Prohibition on the Use of Force
A. The League of Nations Scheme
Throughout history, scholars and statesmen have sought to devise schemes
to abolish aggression between states and establish an international com-
1. John Lancaster & Barton Gellman, U.S. Calls Baghdad Raid a Qualfied Success,
WASH. PosT, June 28, 1993, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence
Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PaRs. Doc. 1183 (June 28, 1993) (hereinafter War
Powers Resolution Letter].
3. See discussion infra part I.B.
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
5. See discussion infra part IV.D.
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munity of peaceful neighbors.6 Although such efforts have generally
failed,7 the twentieth century has seen the international community make
valiant attempts to accomplish that lofty goal.8 The world's "first genuine
attempt to outlaw war"9 was the League of Nations, an international organ-
ization created by thirty-two nations after World War I.10 The members of
the League agreed to:
the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war ... the prescription of
open, just and honourable relations between nations .... the firm establish-
ment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of con-
duct among Governments, and . . . the maintenance of justice and a
scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised
[sic] peoples with one another.11
The Covenant of the League attempted to substitute arbitration,' 2
mediation,' 3 and judicial settlement 14 for war. Despite its efforts, the
League failed to maintain international peace and security and could not
prevent the course of events that ultimately led to the start of World War
6. See generally J. EUGENE HARLEY, DocumEN'ARY TEXTBOOK ON THE UNITED
NATIONS 1-28, 913-15 (1947) (tracing proposals for world peace from ancient China to
twentieth-century Europe).
7. Seek.
8. See id. at 915-36. Prior to World War I, twentieth-century international efforts
focused on establishing legalistic mechanisms to settle disputes between nations. See
generally Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1779, T.S. No. 392 (requiring the solution of international disputes through
"the good offices" or mediation of other nations, or by submission of the dispute to an
impartial International Commission of Inquiry or Permanent Court of Arbitration);
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex to
the Convention, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (establishing international rules of warfare)
[hereinafter Hague IV Convention].
9. J~mEs AvERVJOYCE, BROKEN STAR: THE STORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1919-
1939) 124 (1978).
10. For a brief history of the birth of the League, see AMos YODER, THE EVOLUTON
OF THE UNrrED NATIONS SYSTEM 8-11 (1977).
11. LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovNANT pmbl. These "four pledges" were given by sixty-
one states during the League's existence from 1919-1939. JoYcE, supra note 9, at 50.
Ten of those states left the League during that period. Id. The United States never
joined the League of Nations, as President Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. Senate could
not agree on the scope and substance of the Covenant. SeeYODER, supra note 10, at 10-
11.
12. The League of Nations Covenant required members to submit international
disputes to either arbitration orjudicial settlement. LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art.
12, para. 1; Id. art. 13, para. 1. The members agreed to abide by the arbitrators' deci-
sion and refrain from resorting to war against other members who complied with the
decision. Id. art. 13, par. 4. If neither party agreed with the decision, they could not
resort to war until three months had passed. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
13. The Covenant required members to submit any dispute not already submitted
to arbitration, see supra note 12, or judicial settlement, see infra note 14, to the Council.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 15, para. 1. The Council was a League organ similar
in structure to today's U.N. Security Council. LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 4,
paras. 1-2. See infra text accompanying notes 184-87. The Council was supposed to try
to settle the dispute. LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENAN'r art. 15, paras. 3-4.
14. The Covenant envisioned that members could choose to submit disputes to the
Permanent Court of International Justice for a judicial settlement. See LEAGUE OF
NATIONS COVENANT arts. 12-14.
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II.15 Prior to the War, the Kellogg-Briand Pact had reiterated the League's
goal of world peace.' 6 The signatories to the Pact pledged to "renounce
[war] as an instrument of national policy'1 7 and settle international dis-
putes "by pacific means" only.' 8 In the events leading up to World War II,
Japan and Italy became the first nations to violate the Pact.' 9 The inability
of the League to prevent that war led to its eventual demise. 20
B. The United Nations Scheme
As World War II drew to a close, the United States and its allies (Great
Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China) began to discuss the forma-
tion of a new world organization to replace the League of Nations.2 1 In
August 1944, their representatives met in Washington, D.C., where they
drafted the "Proposals for the Establishment of a General International
Organization."22 At the insistence of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
the new organization was called the "United Nations," which, not coinci-
dentally, was the collective name for the wartime alliance.2 3 On April 25,
1945, the United Nations Conference convened in San Francisco, Califor-
nia, where representatives from fifty nations met to discuss the proposed
draft. 24 After two months of debate, the delegates formally adopted the
Charter of the United Nations,2 5 which entered into force on October 24,
15. See Mvaas S. McDouGAL & FLORENTINO P. FEUCIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 422-24 (1961). See
also infra note 19 and accompanying text.
16. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Pol-
icy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. This
international agreement is commonly called the "Kellogg-Briand Pact" after its negotia-
tors, U.S. Secretary of State H. F. Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand.
JOYCE, supra note 9, at 128-29. The agreement was negotiated outside of the auspices of
the League of Nations. &d at 129. The Pact was initially signed by fifteen, and eventu-
ally by thirty-six, states, including the United States. Id. at 128-29.
17. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 16, art. 1.
18. Id. art. 2.
19. JOYCE, supra note 9, at 129. In 1931, Japan's colonial ambitions led to its inva-
sion of Manchuria, the industrial heart of China. YODER, supra note 10, at 17. In 1934,
similar ambitions led to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. Id. at 20. In both cases, the League
of Nations condemned the action but otherwise did nothing. See id. at 19-22.
20. See McDouGAL & FELCIANO, supra note 15, at 423; YODER, supra note 10, at 23.
Some scholars have attributed the death of the League to the absence of U.S. power
and influence in the League's activities. See, e.g., YODER, supra note 10, at 23, 30. For a
review of the accomplishments of the League in its short history, see id. at 14-16; HAR-
LEv, supra note 6, at 29-30.
21. YODER, supra note 10, at 26-27. For a comprehensive history of the creation of
the United Nations, see generally RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER (1958).
22. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DUMBARTON OAKS DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANI.
ZATION 5-16 (1945), reprinted in RUSSELL, supra note 21, at 1019-28. These proposals
were referred to as the "Dumbarton Oaks Proposals" after the private estate in Washing-
ton, D.C. where the meetings were held. See generally ROBERT C. HiLDER RAND, DUMBAR.
TON OAxS: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR POSTWAR
SECURITY (1990).
23. RUSSELL, supra note 21, at 419.
24. YODER, supra note 10, at 29.
25. RUSSELL, supra note 21, at 932.
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1945.26
The main purpose of the United Nations is to "maintain international
peace and security" 27 so as to "save succeeding generations from the
scourge of var .... -"28 Thus, in one of its first actions, the U.N. General
Assembly29 unanimously affirmed the so-called "Nuremberg Principles":
"[T]he solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy
necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in interna-
tional law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable
and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing."
8 0
The U.N. Charter itself generally prohibits the use of force in interna-
tional affairs by requiring all U.N. members to "refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state"3 1 and to "settle their
international disputes by peaceful means .... ."32 The use of force, or even
26. Id. at 948, 964.
27. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, If 1.
28. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. The other purposes are to "develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace," id.
art. 1, 2, to "achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encourag-
ing respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion," id. art. 1, 1[ 3, and to "be a center for harmonizing
the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends," id. art. 1, 4.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91.
30. See OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY,
NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 50 (1947) [hereinafter
NurembergJudgment]; GA. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg. at 188, U.N.
Doc. A/64 (1946). Immediately after World War II, the Allies established the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany, to try the leaders of Nazi Germany for
their war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Agreement for
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, rectfled by Protocol of Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat.
1586, 8 Bevans 1286. The violation of the "laws or customs of war" were "war crimes."
Id. art. 6. The "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing" consti-
tuted "crimes against peace." Id. The "murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds" constituted
'crimes against humanity." Id. The Tribunal declared the aforementioned principles
regarding the use of force when it found nineteen defendants guilty of these crimes.
NurembergJudgment, supra, at 50, 189-90.
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4. This provision states in full: "All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 3. This provision states in full: "All Members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." Id. See also id. art. 33, 1 ("The
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.").
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the threat of such use, is thus prohibited by the Charter except in two
situations: upon the authorization of the Security Council,3 3 or in self-
defense.3 4 In order to understand the latter exception, one must first
understand the right of self-defense under customary international law.3 5
II. The Customary Right of Sef-Defense
A. The Caroline Case
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter sets forth a series of requirements for the
legitimate exercise of self-defense by U.N. members.3 6 Article 51 begins
with the statement that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual... self-defense .... "37 Although the Charter
does not define the "inherent" right of self-defense,3 8 history provides an
explanation. The resolution of a little-known international dispute
between the United States and Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury provided the standards against which self-defense is measured under
customary international law.3 9 This incident is commonly referred to as
the "Caroline case," although diplomatic correspondence, rather than a
judicial process, resolved the dispute. 40
In late 1837, armed rebellions against British rule erupted through-
out Canada.4 1 Although the United States was officially neutral on the
33. The Security Council is the U.N. organ with "the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. ... " Id. art. 24, 1. See infra notes
184-87 and accompanying text. The Security Council may choose to respond to "any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" by ordering U.N. mem-
bers to take military measures. See U.N. CArTER arts. 39, 42-43, 48.
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 allows U.N. members to act in individual or
collective self-defense. This Note is only concerned with individual self-defense.
35. According to the Third Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law,
"[c]ustomary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). Customary international
law is a source of international law. Id. § 102(1) (a). See also Statute of the International
Court ofJustice,June 26, 1945, art. 38, 1, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993, 25 (defin-
ing "international custom" as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law"). Other
sources of international law are international agreements, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS Lw OF THE UNrrD STATES § 102(1)(b) (1987), and general
principles common to the major legal systems of the world, id. § 102(1)(b)-(c).
36. U.N. CARTER art. 51. See discussion infra part III.A
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
38. See Kathryn S. Elliot, Note, The New World Order and the Right of Self-Defense in the
United Nations Charter, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 55, 66 (1991).
39. Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Development
of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493, 504 (1990).
40. Samuel R. Maizel, Intervention in Grenada, 35 NAy. L. RE%,. 47, 72 n.136 (1986).
The discussion of the Caroline incident in the text is necessarily limited to those facts
most relevant to the issues at the heart of this Note. For a more detailed recitation of
this fascinating story, see generally Rogoff & Collins, supra note 39; R.Y. Jennings, The
Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
41. In the Treaty of Paris (1763), France had given the colony of Canada to Great
Britain. See Definitive Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain and Spain, Feb.
10, 1763, art. 4, 42 C.T.S. 279, 324. After the American Revolution, Canada remained a
British colony. However, an overwhelming majority of its inhabitants were French-
Vol. 28
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issue of independence for its northern neighbor,42 Americans living along
the U.S.-Canada border were actively sympathetic to the rebel cause.43 On
December 7, 1837, the rebellion ended in Upper Canada "in an almost
bloodless farce" when the British stopped the rebel force in its drive to
take Toronto. 44 William Lyon Mackenzie, the rebel leader, then fled to
Buffalo, New York, where he sought arms and American volunteers.4 5 On
December 13, 1837, Mackenzie's new recruits invaded and took possession
of Navy Island, part of Upper Canada.46 There the "Patriot Army" estab-
lished a provisional government and prepared to invade mainland Can-
ada.47 For two weeks, additional men and arms arrived at Navy Island
from New York. 48
On December 29, 1837, the Caroline, a privately-owned U.S. steam-
boat, delivered men and arms from Buffalo to Navy Island.4 9 The ship
made two additional trips of the same nature that day between Schlosser,
New York and Navy Island, finally docking for the night at Schlosser.50 In
speaking Roman Catholics who did not like the Protestant British loyalists. JOSEPH
SCHULL, REBELL1ON: THE RISING IN FRENCH CANADA 1837 4 (1971). Thus, in 1791, Brit-
ain divided the colony along the Ottawa River into Upper Canada (roughly the present-
day province of Ontario) for their British citizens and Lower Canada (roughly the pres-
ent-day province of Quebec) for their French citizens. Id.; ALBERT B. COREY, THE CRIsIs
OF 1830-1842 IN CANADIAN-AMEmuCAN RELATIONS 3-5 (1941). On November 6, 1837,
Lower Canadian rebels began fighting for independence from the British. SCHuLL,
supra, at 59-60. On December 5, 1837, the rebellion extended to Upper Canada.
COREY, supra, at 29.
42. The Neutrality Act of 1818 provided for the fine and imprisonment of Ameri-
cans who joined a rebellion against a foreign country or who enlisted the military assist-
ance of Americans during an insurrection in a foreign country. See Neutrality Act of
1818, ch. 88, 3 Stat. 447, 448 (1818). President Martin Van Buren issued two proclama-
tions calling on American citizens to obey the Act with respect to the Canadian rebel-
lion. See Proclamation of Jan. 5, 1838, 11 Stat. 784 (1838); Proclamation of Nov. 21,
1838, 11 Stat 785 (1838). See also Neutrality Act of 1838, ch. 31, 5 Stat. 212 (1838)
(providing for the confiscation of any vessel used in military expeditions against a for-
eign country not at war with the United States).
43. COREv, supra note 41, at 28-29. Americans sympathetic to the rebels held public
meetings and organized revolutionary expeditions into Canada. Id. at 29, 33-34.
44. SCHULL, supra note 41, at 131. In the words of Sir Francis B. Head, Lieutenant
Governor of Upper Canada, "the ridiculous attempt of four hundred men to revolu-
tionize a country containing nearly half a million inhabitants had been put down by the
people instantly and decidedly, without the loss of a man." H.R. Doc. No. 302, 25th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 3, 4 (1838) (letter from Head to British Amb. Henry Fox, Jan. 8,
1838) [hereinafter Head Letter].
45. Head Letter, supra note 44, at 5.
46. Id. Navy Island is located on the Canadian side of the Niagara River, within
three miles of Niagara Falls. SCHULL, supra note 41, at 132.
47. CoREY, supra note 41, at 34-35.
48. Id. at 35; Head Letter, supra note 44, at 5-6. The force totalled between 500 and
1500 men, including a small number of rebels from Upper Canada. Id. at 5. MacKen-
zie placed Rensselaer Van Rensselaer, son of the War of 1812 hero General Solomon
Van Rensselaer, in command of the forces on Navy Island. COREY, supra note 41, at 35.
49. CoREY, supra note 41, at 36-37; H.R. Doc. No. 302, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., at 17
(1838) (deposition of Gilman Appleby, Dec. 30, 1837) [hereinafter Appleby Deposi-
tion]. Appleby was the captain of the Caroline on its supply trips to Navy Island. Id.
50. Appleby Deposition, supra note 49, at 17. When the Caroline docked at
Schlosser, there were ten crew members and officers aboard. That night, the crew
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order to prevent more supply trips to the rebels, Colonel Allen McNab,
the British commander whose forces were situated across the river on the
Canadian mainland at Chippewa, ordered that the ship be destroyed.5 1
Consequently, around midnight, British troops boarded the Caroline and
attacked the passengers and crew, who abandoned the ship without resist-
ance.52 The British then set the steamboat on fire, cut her loose from the
dock, and set her adrift over Niagara Falls.53 Two men were killed, and
two others were taken prisoner.54
The U.S. Secretary of State, John Forsyth, sent a letter of protest to
allowed twenty-six U.S. citizens to sleep on the steamboat because the civilians had been
unable to find lodgings in town. Id.
51. Head Letter, supra note 44, at 6-7. See also H.R. Doc. No. 302, 25th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 62 (1838) (letter from Cpt. Andrew Drew to Col. Allen McNab, Dec. 30, 1837)
[hereinafter Drew Letter].
52. Appleby Deposition, supra note 49, at 17-18. According to the captain of the
Caroline:
[A]bout midnight, [I] was informed by one of the watch that several boats,
filled with men, were making towards the Caroline from the river; and [I] imme-
diately gave the alarm, and, before [I] was able to reach the deck, the Caroline
was boarded by some seventy or eighty men, all of whom were armed ....
[T]hey immediately commenced a warfare, with muskets, swords, and cutlasses,
upon the defenceless [sic] crew and passengers of the Caroline, under a fierce
cry of "G-d damn theml give them no quartersl kill every man! fire, firel"...
[TI he Caroline was abandoned without resistance, and the only effort made, by
either the crew or passengers, seemed to be to escape slaughter.
Id. The British commander of the mission viewed the events from a slightly different
perspective: "[A]ll those on board the steamer who did not resist were quietly put on
shore, as I thought it possible there might be some American citizen[s] on board.
Those who assailed us were of course dealt with according to the usages of war." Drew
Letter, supra note 52, at 62.
53. Appleby Deposition, supra note 49, at 18. According to one scholar, "[n]o other
incident during the entire period of border troubles from 1837 to 1842 produced a
comparably electrifying effect upon Americans, Canadians, and Britishers." CoREY,
supra note 41, at 37. A poem written about the incident captured the imagination of
many New Yorkers:
As over the shelving rocks she broke,
And plunged in her turbulent grave,
The slumbering genius of freedom woke,
Baptized in Niagara's wave,
And sounded her warning Tocsin far,
From Atlantic's shore to the polar star.
See HowardJones, Daniel Webster: The Diplomatis, in DANIEL WEBSE: "THE COMPLETEST
MAN" 203, 204 (1990). On January 14, 1838, the rebels abandoned Navy Island. H.R.
Doc. No. 302, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., at 36, 37 (1838) (letter from U.S. Attorney N.S.
Benton to Secretary of State John Forsyth, Feb. 6, 1838) [hereinafter Benton Letter].
54. The two men who died had apparently been shot after they escaped from the
Caroline and were on U.S. territory. The British troops soon released the two men who
had been taken prisoner. Benton Letter, supra note 53, at 37. The State of New York
later arrested Alexander McLeod, a British subject, for the murder of Amos Durfee, one
of the American casualties. This added to the tensions between the United States and
Great Britain caused by the Caroline incident. Jennings, supra note 40, at 92-93. For
details on the resolution of this aspect of the crisis, see generally id. at 92-99; CoREv,
supra note 41, ch. 9.
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Great Britain's Ambassador to the United States, Henry Fox.55 In reply,
Fox justified the British action as self-defense. 56 Daniel Webster, Forsyth's
successor at the State Department, sent the British his view of the require-
ments for a legitimate claim of national self-defense. 5 7 According to
Webster,
[i]t will be for [the British] to show a necessity of self-defence [sic], instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
tion. It will be for it to shew [sic], also, that the local authorities of Canada,
even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the
territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence [sic], must be limited
by that necessity and kept clearly within it.5 8
In addition, Webster called on the British to show that "admonition or
remonstrance to the persons on board the Caroline was impracticable or
would have been unavailing," and that "it would not have been enough
[simply] to [have] seize[d] and detain[ed] the vessel . . . ,,59 Webster
argued that the British action did not satisfy these four requirements: an
imminent threat, a necessary action, a proportionate response, and the
exhaustion of peaceful means prior to taking action.6 0
Lord Ashburton, a special British representative to Washington,6 ' not
only agreed with Webster's articulation of the law, but also attempted to
show that the British had indeed met all of the requirements.6 2 He also
55. H.R. Doc. No. 302, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1838) (letter from Forsyth to Fox,
Jan. 5, 1838). In particular, Forsyth noted that the British action, committed against
American citizens and property on American territory, had caused "the most painful
emotions of surprise and regret." Id. He also warned Fox that President Van Buren
had sent American forces to the U.S.-Canadian border to repel any future attacks, and
that "if [such an attack] should occur, [Van Buren] cannot be answerable for the effects
of the indignation of the neighboring people of the United States." Id.
56. H.R. Doc. No. 302, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1838) (letter from Fox to Forsyth,
Feb. 6, 1838). Fox argued that America's failure to enforce its neutrality laws had
forced the British "to consult their own security, by pursuing and destroying the vessel
of their piratical enemy, wheresoever they might find her." Id.
57. 1 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS: REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM THE FOR-
EIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL PRINT, PART 1, SERIES C, NORTH AiERIuCA, 1837-1914, (Ken-
neth Bourne ed., 1986) [hereinafter BRITISH DOcuMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS]
Document 99 at 159 (letter from Webster to Fox, April 24, 1841) [hereinafter Docu-
ment 99].
58. Id. See also BRmsH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 57, Document
205 at 331 (letter to Ashburton, July 27, 1842) [hereinafter Document 205].
59. Document 99, supra note 57, at 159.
60. Id.
61. In 1841, Great Britain had sent Lord Ashburton to Washington to resolve sev-
eral issues of contention between the two nations, including the Caroline incident, the
McLeod case, supra note 54, and the location of the U.S.-Canada border. Jennings,
supra note 40, at 88.
62. BiRTsH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 57, Document 206 at 332-
35 (letter from Ashburton to Webster, July 28, 1842). Lord Ashburton wrote that
the only question between us is whether [the destruction of the Caroline] came
within the limits [of self-defense]: whether, to use your words, there was 'that
necessity of self-defence [sic], instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
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apologized for the British violation of American territory.63 Although
Webster was not convinced by Ashburton's arguments, he accepted the
British apology and expressed his satisfaction that both governments had
agreed on the standard for national self-defense.6 4
B. The Caroline Standard as Customary International Law
Professors Rogoff and Collins state that "It] he great significance of the
Caroline doctrine in modem international law results from.., an accept-
ance of Webster's formulation on resort to force in self-defense as authori-
tative customary law."6 5 Several scholars have even argued that the
Caroline incident established standards for evaluating the legitimacy of
"anticipatory self-defense," since the British attacked the steamboat in
order to prevent the rebels from invading Canada.6 6 The NurembergJudg-
ment6 7 is the most commonly cited example of the acceptance of the Caro-
line standard as customary international law.68
After World War II, the Allies established the International Military
Tribunal to try the leaders of Nazi Germany for their war crimes, crimes
against peace, and crimes against humanity.6 9 In its decision, the Tribu-
nal relied on the Caroline standard in rejecting the defendants' argument
that their actions constituted legitimate self-defense. 70 The Germans
means' which preceded the destruction of the Caroline while moored to the
shore of the United States.
Id. at 333. Lord Ashburton stated that the destruction of the Caroline was necessary
because the steamboat had been "the important means and instrument by which num-
bers and arms were hourly increasing," and the United States had not taken steps to
enforce its neutrality by cutting off the supply line. Id. at 333. He argued that the
British had acted in response to an imminent threat, since the attackers had expected
to find the ship moored at Navy Island in British waters. Thus, there had been no time
for deliberation: "[T ] he expedition was not planned with a premeditated purpose of
attacking the enemy within the jurisdiction of the United States, but... the necessity of
so doing arose from altered circumstances at the moment of execution." Id. at 334. He
also maintained that the attack was not excessive, noting that the British forces had
acted in the middle of the night in order to minimize casualties, and that they had sent
the burning ship adrift in order to prevent injury to American citizens or property. Id.
at 334.
63. Id. at 335. He added that the British should have apologized immediately after
the incident occurred: "[Tihis, with a frank explanation of the necessity of the case,
might and probably would have prevented much of the exasperation and of the subse-
quent complaints and recriminations, to which it gave rise." Id.
64. BRITISH DocuMENrs ON FOREIGN AFrAnis, supra note 57, Document 214 at 346-
47 (letter from Webster to Ashburton, August 6, 1842).
65. Rogoff & Collins, supra note 39, at 504.
66. See, e.g., Rogoff & Collins, supra note 39, at 500; Louis Rene Beres, Preserving the
Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipatry Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 111, 124 (1993); D.W. BowErr, SELF-DEXENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
188-89 (1958).
67. See supra note 30.
68. See, e.g., McDoUGAL & FELiiANO, supra note 15, at 232; BowE-r, supra note 66,
at 142-43; Rogoff & Collins, supra note 39, at 504-05.
69. See supra note 30.
70. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 30, at 36. Although neither the League of
Nations Covenant nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact had explicitly provided for the right of
self-defense, the signatories generally agreed that such a right was nevertheless pre-
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argued that Germany's invasion of Norway in 1940 was necessary in order
to prevent the Allies from occupying Norway;71 essentially, they based
their claim on the concept of anticipatory self-defense. 72 Citing Webster's
formulation, the Tribunal stated: "It must be remembered that preventive
action in foreign territory is justified only in case of 'an instant and over-
whelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and no
moment of deliberation." 7 3 The Tribunal then found that the defend-
ants had failed to meet this standard, as it believed that Germany had actu-
ally invaded Norway in order to acquire a base from which to attack
England and France.74 Thus, although it found the defendants' claim
groundless,75 the Tribunal recognized the legitimacy of basing a claim of
national self-defense on the Caroline standard.76 According to the Third
Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, the fact that international judicial
tribunals have relied on a particular rule lends substantial weight towards
determining that the rule has become international law.7
7
I. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
A. The Debate over the Interpretation of Article 51
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states in frll:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members
in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
served. SeeJuuus STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 32 (1958); SUBHAS C. KHARE,
USE OF FORCE UNDER UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 71 (1985). As explained by U.S. Secre-
tary of State Kellogg:.
Express recognition by treaty of [the] inalienable right [of self-defense] ...
gives rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression.
It is the identical question approached from the other side. Inasmuch as no
treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defense, it is not in the
interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-
defense since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord
with an agreed definition.
Note to the Signatory Governments,June 23, 1928, in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATY FOR
THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR: TEXT OF THE TREATy, NOTES ExcHANcED, INSTRUMENTS OF
RATIFICATION AND OF ADHERENCE, AND OTHER PAPERS 9, 57 (1933).
71. See NurembergJudgment, supra note 30, at 36.
72. See supra text accompanying note 66.
73. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 30, at 36 (quoting Document 99, supra
note 57, at 159).
74. Id. at 38.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 103(2) (a) (1987). More recently, the International Court ofJustice noted that the
requirements of proportionality and necessity are "well established in customary inter-
national law." Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nica-
ragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 94, para. 176, repinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023, 1063, para.
176 (1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. U.S.].
Cornell International Law Journal
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.78
Every time that a nation employs Article 51 to justify the use of force,
the meaning of Article 51 becomes the subject of much debate among
scholars and international actors. 79 The debate is over whether to inter-
pret Article 51 in a broad or restrictive way. Those who argue for a broad
reading maintain that Article 51 merely codifies the customary right of
self-defense and allows states wide latitude in using force.8 0 Those who
argue for a restrictive reading respond that the language of Article 51
qualifies the customary right by placing conditions on the use of force. 8 1
Because Article 51 states that the U.N. Charter does not "impair the
inherent right of individual... self-defense,"8 2 the proponents of the broad
view argue that the framers of the Charter intended to preserve the cus-
tomary right of self-defense.8 3 They interpret "inherent right" as allowing
the use of force in self-defense if the Caroline standard is satisfied.8 4 More-
over, they maintain that the customary right is absolute, since the lan-
guage of Article 51 clearly states that "[n]othing in the present Charter
shall impair" it.8 5
The proponents of the restrictive view also rely on the language of
Article 51 to support their arguments.86 As explained by Professor Khare,
"The right even though stated in terms of being 'inherent' and
unimpaired has been made subject to a number of restrictions imposed by
the Charter. It is not an absolute freedom of states to use force in self-
defense."8 7 In order to take action in self-defense, the "victim state" must
be acting in response to an "armed attack" by the "aggressor state."8 8 The
"victim state" can act on its own "until the Security Council has taken the
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
79. See, e.g., infra parts III.B.1-3, IV.D. One reason why the debate resurfaces every
time that Article 51 is invoked is that the U.N. Charter makes no provision for its own
interpretation and no other international body can issue authoritative interpretations.
Elliot, supra note 38, at 66.
80. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., Bowis-r, supra note 66, at 185, 187. Bowett states: "It is ... fallacious to
assume that members [of the United Nations] have only those rights which the Charter
accords to them; on the contrary they have those rights which general international law
accords to them except and in so far as they have surrendered them under the Char-
ter." I& at 185. See also McDouGAL & FELCIANO, supra note 15, at 252-53. This view is
supported by the fact that the drafters of Article 51 revised a prior draft in order to
make the right of self-defense explicitly "inherent." RUSSELL, supra note 21, at 698.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
85. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL.
L. REv. 89, 94 (1989).
86. See, e.g., Louis HENKrN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN PoLicY 294-95
(1979); PHILIP C.JrssuP, A MODERN LAw OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 165-66 (1952).
87. KHAE, supra note 70, at 129.
88. This Note will use the term "victim state" to designate the state that is claiming
self-defense as the justification for its action and "aggressor state" as the state against
whom the "victim state" has acted.
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measures necessary" to maintain international peace and security.8 9 The
"victim state" must "immediately" report its action to the Security Coun-
cil;90 however, the fact that the Security Council has been so notified does
not affect its power to take "at any time" any action "as it deems necessary"
for international peace and security.91 Thus, Article 51 seems to qualify
the customary right, most significantly by requiring that the action be in
response to an "armed attack."92 However, the meaning and scope of this
requirement is itself a source of controversy.
As with the whole of Article 51 itself, there are broad and restrictive
views regarding the proper interpretation of the term "armed attack."
The most restrictive view maintains that the term refers only to a direct
physical invasion by one state into the territory of another and not to any
other direct or indirect forms of aggression.93 Critics of the restrictive
view argue that it fails to address modern issues such as terrorism, 9 4 bio-
logical warfare,95 and nuclear weapons.96 Yet there are broader interpre-
tations of "armed attack" which include: any aggressive event against the
victim state;9 7 a number of smaller actions that constitute a continuous
campaign of attacks against the victim state; 98 a state allowing terrorists to
launch their activities from its territory against the victim state;99 an attack
on nationals outside of the territory of the victim state; °0 0 and apparent
preparations to attack the victim state soon.10 1 The United States has
argued for a broad reading of Article 51 on several recent occasions.' 0 2




93. See, e.g., JEssuP, supra note 86, at 166. See also Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 LC.J. 94,
paras. 194-95, 247.
94. See, e.g., Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Chater), 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 25 (1987); Sofaer,
supra note 86, at 94-95.
95. See, e.g., David Turndorf, Note, The US. Raid on Libya:. A Forceful Response to
Terrorism, 14 BRooV. J. INT'L L. 187, 219 (1988).
96. See, e.g., McDoUGAL & FELLANO, supra note 15, at 238; HEmN'u, supra note 86,
at 14344 (arguing that even though "armed attack" must be interpreted narrowly, the
U.N. Charter must allow an exception for the use of anticipatory self-defense against an
imminent nuclear attack).
97. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 85, at 94; Eugene V. Rostow, The Legality of the Interna-
tional Use of Force by and from States, 10 YALEJ. INT'L L. 286, 287 (1985).
98. See, e.g.,James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural
Constraints in International Law, in Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AMz. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 307, 314 (1987).
99. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 94, at 38.
100. See, e.g., Tumdorf, supra note 95, at 219-20; Sofaer, supra note 85, at 96.
101. Such preparations would invoke the doctrine of"anticipatory self-defense." See,
e.g., Bowrr, supra note 66, at 188-92. Bowett argues that "[n]o state can be expected
to await an initial attack which ... may well destroy the state's capacity for further
resistance and so jeopardize its very existence." Id. at 191-92. See also McDoucAL &
FECimNo, supra note 15, at 237 ("Whether the events that precipitate the claim of self-
defense constitute an actual, current attack or an imminently impending attack, the
claim remains subject to the reviewing authority of the organized community.").
102. See infra parts mH.B.1-2.
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However, the United Nations has adhered to the restrictive view. 103
B. The Limits of Article 51
Despite the prohibition on the use of force in the U.N. Charter, l0 4 nations
have nevertheless acted unilaterally when they have felt that it was in their
national interest to do so.' 0 5 They have often relied on Article 51 to argue
that the act was necessary for their self-defense.106 Yet the United Nations
has consistently held to the restrictive interpretation of that provision. 10 7
As Professor Schachter explains:
The [Security] Council has rejected claims of self-defense in several cases
(notably against states whose policies were generally disapproved). No reso-
lution has been adopted explicitly upholding a claim of self-defense,
though in a few cases a resolution or the Council's failure to act has been
construed by commentators as tacit approval or toleration of the use of
force in question. The Council, more often than not, has been precluded
by the veto from reaching formal decision on the validity of such claims.
Most of the cases were then considered by the General Assembly, which,
unfettered by the veto, generally condemned the alleged self-defense action
as a Charter violation. In no such case, however, has the target state
accepted the [U.N.'s] decision as binding upon it.'0 8
However, nations continue to argue for the expansion of Article 51.109
The following are two examples of recent claims by the United States
which have reignited the debate in the United Nations over the permissi-
103. See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L 259, 273
(1989).
104. See supra part I.B.
105. See infra note 110 and parts III.B.1-2, IV.
106. See infra note 110 and parts III.B.1-2, IV.
107. See Schachter, supra note 103, at 263, 273.
108. Id. at 263-64 (citations omitted).
109. Professor Schachter has surveyed the incidents and placed them in seven
categories:
(1) the use of force to rescue political hostages believed to face imminent dan-
ger of death or injury;
(2) the use of force against officials or installations in a foreign state believed to
support terrorist acts directed against nationals of the state claiming the right of
defense;
(3) the use of force against troops, planes, vessels or installations believed to
threaten imminent attack by a state with declared hostile intent;
(4) the use of retaliatory force against a government or military force so as to
deter renewed attacks on the state taking such action;
(5) the use of force against a government that has provided arms or technical
support to insurgents in a third state;
(6) the use of force against a government that has allowed its territory to be
used by military forces of a third state considered to be a threat to the state
claiming self-defense;
(7) the use of force in the name of collective defense (or counterintervention)
against a government imposed by foreign forces and faced with large-scale mili-
tary resistance by many of its people.
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ble scope of Article 51.110
1. Air Raid on Libya
The once-friendly relationship between the United States and Libya has
grown increasingly tense since Colonel Muammar Gaddafi seized power in
a 1969 coup d'6tat."' Under Gaddafi's leadership, Libya has directed or
supported many terrorist acts around the world,"12 particularly against
American interests." 3 The United States initially responded only with
economic and political pressures, which failed to deter the Libyan
leader.1 14 The hostility between the two countries intensified dramatically
Id. at 271 (citations omitted).
110. According to Professor Schachter, "The U.S. has tended to provide fuller and
more sophisticated legal justifications than most other countries, probably because
Congress and important sectors of public opinion are concerned about the legitimacy
of American action." Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 113, 118 (1986). In contrast, many other countries "have limited
their claims to brief and general phrases of Charter terminology and their own version
of the relevant facts." I&.
111. On December 24, 1951, Libya became an independent state after almost forty
years as an Italian colony. LaVerle Berry, Historical Setting, in LIBYA: A COUNTRY STUDY
3, 24, 34-37 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1989) [hereinafter LIBYA]. Under the leadership
of King Idris I, Libya was originally a federal monarchy with a pro-Western foreign pol-
icy. Id. at 37-38. On September 1, 1969, the military seized control of the government
and abolished the monarchy. Id. at 42. One of the leaders of the coup, Muammar al
Gaddafi, quickly consolidated power and became the effective head of state. Id. at 43-
45. In the 1970s, Gaddafi turned Libya into a socialistjamahiriya ("state of the masses"),
a society in which the people would govern themselves without the constraints of the
modem bureaucratic state. Id. at 47. Gaddafi relinquished most of his official duties
and assumed the title "Leader of the Revolution." Id. at 48-49. Despite his anti-commu-
nist beliefs, he developed a close relationship with the former Soviet Union and other
Eastern European countries, id. at 46, primarily because of.American support for Israel.
Richard Stengel, Gaddafi: Obsessed by a Ruthless, Messianic Vision, TIME, Apr. 21, 1986, at
28, 29.
112. Under Gaddafi, Libya has declared its support of "national liberation move-
ments" and has allegedly financed and trained numerous terrorist groups and organiza-
tions, including Palestinian radicals, Lebanese leftists, Columbia's M-19 guerrillas, the
Irish Republican Army, anti-Turkish Armenians, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Muslim
rebels in the Philippines, and left-wing extremists in Europe and Japan. Berry, supra
note 111, at 56-57; Stengel, Gaddafi, supra note 111, at 29; MARTIN SIicKE, THE MAKING
OF A PARIAH SATE: THE ADvENTuRIsr PoLmcs OF MuAImAR QADDAFI 119 (1987). In
addition, Gaddafi "turned Libya into a kind of Palm Springs for despots and terrorists,"
by providing sanctuary for individuals such as Idi Amin, the former dictator of Uganda;
Abu Nidal, the Palestinian terrorist; and the three surviving members of the Black Sep-
tember guerrilla group which killed eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games.
Stengel, Gaddafi, supra note 111, at 29.
113. During the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddafi ordered numerous direct attacks on the
United States, including the murder of two U.S. diplomats in Khartoum (1973), the
attempted assassination of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1973), the burning
of the U.S. embassy in Tripoli (1979), the firing on U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft during naval
exercises in the Persian Gulf (1981), the planned assassination of U.S. President Ronald
Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger, and U.S. Ambassador to Italy Maxwell Rabb (1981), and
the hijacking of T.W.A. Flight 847 (1985). SICKER, supra note 112, at 113-17; Richard
Stengel, Sailing in Harm's Way, TIME, Apr. 7, 1986, at 16.
114. Until the 1980s, the United States responded mildly to Libya's provocations. See
Shawky S. Zeidan, Government and Politics, in LIBYA, supra note 111, at 173, 229. In 1981,
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at the beginning of 1986, which was, ironically, the "International Year of
Peace."1 15 In January, American intelligence linked Libya to the Decem-
ber 27, 1985 bombings at the Rome and Vienna airports, 1 6 which killed
nineteen people (including five Americans) and injured 112 people. 117
In a show of force, U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent American war-
ships on maneuvers to the Gulf of Sidra, off Libya's northern coast. 118
Since 1973, Gaddafi had claimed that the 300 mile-wide gulf was within
the territorial waters of Libya. 119 Most countries rejected this claim, but
only the United States directly challenged it. 120 Although President
Jimmy Carter had ordered U.S. forces not to penetrate into the claimed
territory,121 President Reagan declared that the United States would
regard all areas beyond twelve nautical miles from the coast as interna-
tional waters, pursuant to international law.' 22 Subsequently, on March
24, 1986, U.S. ships and planes crossed Gaddafi's so-called "line of
death."1 23 The Libyans fired six surface-to-air missiles at the U.S. forces,
the Reagan Administration closed the Libyan diplomatic mission in the United States,
expelled all Libyan diplomatic personnel from the United States, and ordered all Amer-
icans in Libya to leave that country. Id. at 229; SICKER, supra note 112, at 116-17. In
1982, the Administration barred imports of Libyan oil into the United States and
exports of American technology and equipment to Libya. Id. at 117.
115. See GA. Res. 40/3, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 49th plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/40/3 (1985).
116. William R. Doerner, Slapping Back at GaddaA TIME, Jan. 20, 1986, at 16, 17.
Most of the evidence was classified, id., but European investigators believed that the
terrorists were associates of Abu Nidal, a Palestinian terrorist leader based in Libya.
William E. Smith, An Eye for an Eye, TIME, Jan. 13, 1986, at 26. The bombings were
apparently in retaliation for Israel's 1985 bombing of the headquarters of the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Id. at 27.
117. Smith, supra note 116, at 26. The immediate U.S. reaction to the bombings was
to freeze Libyan assets in the United States and impose other economic sanctions.
Doerner, supra note 116, at 16. When Gaddafi remarked that the sanctions were "tanta-
mount to a declaration of war," President Reagan replied, "I think if it ever came to a
declaration of war, they'd be aware of the difference." Id. at 17 (quoting President
Reagan).
118. Cat and Mouse with Gaddafi, TIME, Feb. 3, 1986, at 18. Reagan sent two aircraft
carriers, together carrying about 100 supersonic aircraft, and approximately two dozen
auxiliary vessels from the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Id.
119. Id. SeealsoJean I Tartter, National Security, inLIBYA, supranote 111, at 239, 252.
Gaddafi had claimed the Gulf of Sidra by drawing a straight line between points near
the Libyan cities of Benghazi on the eastern side of the Gulf and Misratah on the west-
ern side of the gulf. Id. at 252. This boundary, which Gaddafi called the "line of
death," is midway between the thirty-second and thirty-third parallels, 130 miles from
the Libyan coast. Cat and Mouse with Gaddafi, supra note 118, at 18.
120. Zeidan, supra note 114, at 252. In August of 1981, Libyan warplanes fired on
two U.S. Navy aircraft participating in naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. After the
missiles missed their targets, the American pilots shot down the Libyan planes. Id. at
252-53.
121. Id. at 229.
122. Id. at 252. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 3, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1272 (1982) ("Every State has
the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this
Convention.").
123. Stengel, supra note 113, at 17-18.
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none of which hit their targets. 124 Once attacked, the U.S. forces sunk two
Libyan vessels 12 5 and bombed a Libyan missile site.126 There were no
American casualties-yet. 12 7
On April 5, 1986, U.S. intelligence officials intercepted messages from
the Libyan capital, Tripoli, to the Libyan diplomatic mission in East Berlin
regarding a plan to bomb locations in West Berlin known to be frequented
by Americans.128 Within fifteen minutes, a bomb exploded in a West Ber-
lin nightclub. 129 The explosion killed two people, including an American
soldier, and injured 230 others, including dozens of American soldiers.' 30
A few hours later, another intercepted message from Tripoli offered con-
gratulations for the successful mission. 3 1 The United States believed that
these messages, specifically linking Gaddafi with the terrorist act, provided
enough evidence to justify a wider response than the Gulf of Sidra
operation. 3 2
Consequently, on April 14, 1986, President Reagan ordered an air
strike against five Libyan military targets, including the army compound
which Gaddafi used as a command center and residence. 133 The strike
was successful.' 3 4 The United States justified the action as an act of self-
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id. at 20. Libya lost a French-built Combattante-class missile attack craft and a
Soviet-built Nanuchka-class missile corvette. Zeidan, supra note 114, at 253.
126. Stengel, supra note 113, at 20-21. Navy warplanes twice launched high-speed
anti-radiation missiles at a Soviet-built missile site on the Libyan coast. The attacks
destroyed the radar transmitter and its replacement unit, temporarily closing down the
site. Id. at 20. The United States justified its actions as self-defense under Article 51.
See U.N. Doc. S/17938 (1986) (letter from Vernon A. Walters, U.S. Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations).
127. Stengel, supra note 113, at 20. Libyan officials later claimed that fifty-six Libyans
died in the fighting. GeorgeJ. Church, Targeting Gaddafi TimE, Apr. 21, 1986, at 20.




132. Church, supra note 127, at 20. Libya denied any connection with the bombing.
See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/41/279, S/17986 (1986) (letter from Rajab A. Azzarouk, Charg6
d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United
Nations).
133. William R Doerner, In the Dead of the Night, TiME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 28-29. The
other targets were the military section of the Tripoli International Airport, Gaddafi's
alternate command post at the Benghazi army barracks, a commando training facility
near Tripoli, and Libyan fighter planes at the Benina airfield. Id. Reagan later denied
that he had tried to kill the Libyan leader during the attack. Michael R. Gordon, Rea-
gan Denies Libya Raid Was Meant to Kill Qadhafi, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1986, at A5. In any
event, Gaddafi was sleeping in an underground bunker at the time and survived the
attack; however, an eighteen month-old baby girl, reportedly Gaddafi's adopted daugh-
ter, did not survive. GeorgeJ. Church, Hitting the Source, TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 18.
134. Church, supra note 133, at 18. However, the United States lost two fighter pilots
and accidentally caused civilian casualties and damage to non-military targets. Doerner,
supra note 133, at 30. Moreover, several terrorist incidents immediately followed the air
strike. See Church, supra note 133, at 19; Pico Iyer, Nearly All Together Now, TIME, May 5,
1986, at 28. In addition, Libya has refused to extradite two Libyans charged in connec-
tion with the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, in which 270 people were killed. See
Clinton Vows U.S. Will Pursue Justice in Pan Am Bombing, N.Y. TIEs, Dec. 22, 1993, at A9;
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defense consistent with Article 51.135 When the Security Council consid-
ered the incident on the following day, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Vernon Walters argued that the United States had acted in self-
defense only after peaceful measures had failed to stop the Libyan attacks
on the United States.' 3 6 He stated that the attack was "necessary" to end
Libya's "continued policy of terrorist threats and the use of force, in viola-
tion of ... Article 2(4) of the Charter."13 7 The attack was therefore
"designed to disrupt Libya's ability to carry out terrorist acts and to deter
future terrorist acts by Libya."13 8 He also maintained that the action was
"proportionate," because the attack struck military installations that were
used to direct and carry out Libya's terrorism, and also because the United
States attempted to avoid civilian casualties and limit collateral damage.13 9
On April 21, 1986, the Security Council considered a draft resolution
proposed by Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago, and the
United Arab Emirates. 140 The resolution condemned the U.S. action as a
"violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of interna-
tional conduct."' 4 ' The United States, Great Britain, and France vetoed
the draft resolution.142 At Libya's urging, the General Assembly later con-
demned the attack and demanded compensation for material and human
losses suffered by Libya.143
George J. Church, Wanted: A New Hideout, TME, Apr. 6, 1992, at 29. See also Khadafi
Proposes Handing Over Lockerbie Suspects to Egypt, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 28, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file (discussing Gaddafi's proposal, which was
rejected, to transfer the suspects to Egypt instead of to the United States and Great
Britain).
135. See President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the United States Air
Strike Against Libya, 1986 PuB. PAPERS 468, 469 (Apr. 14, 1986); U.N. Doc. S/17990
(1986) (letter from Herbert S. Okun, Acting U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations).
136. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2674th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2674 (1986) (state-
ment by Vernon A. Walters, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations).
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 15.
139. Id. at 13-15.
140. See U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2682d mtg. at 43, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2682 (1986).
141. U.N. Doc. S/18016/Rev.1, at 1 (1986) (revised draft resolution).
142. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2682d mtg. at 43, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2682 (1986). The
result of the voting was nine votes in favor (Bulgaria, China, Congo, Ghana, Madagas-
car, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, the Soviet Union, and the United Arab Emirates),
five votes opposed (Australia, Denmark, France, Great Britain, and the United States),
and one abstention (Venezuela). Id. For a discussion of the Great Power Veto, see infra
part III.B.3.
143. GA. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 78th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 53, at 34-35,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (1986). This resolution was adopted 79-28, with 33 absten-
tions. Anthony Goodman, U.N. Assembly Condemns Last April's US. Attack on Libya,
Reuters, Nov. 20, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. For the scholarly
debate on the legality of the air raid, see generally Tumdorf, supra note 95; Wallace F.
Warriner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion Under International Law: A Legal Analysis of the
United States Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 NAy. L. R. 49 (1988); Militay Responses to
Terrorism, 81 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 288 (remarks of Francis A. Boyle).
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2. Invasion of Panama
For thirty years, Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama had been an impor-
tant source of U.S. intelligence regarding developments in Central
America and the Caribbean.'4 He provided information to the United
States from his days as a cadet at a Panamanian military academy up
through his days as the Commander-in-Chief of the Panama Defense
Force and de facto leader of Panama.' 45 However, during the 1980s, the
United States lost control of Noriega. He provided arms and intelligence
to his anti-American neighbors, 146 helped the Colombian Medellin drug
cartel smuggle cocaine into the United States, 147 and generally impeded
the progress of democracy in Panama. 148 On February 4, 1988, two fed-
eral grand juries in Florida indicted Noriega on fifteen charges of interna-
tional drug trafficking, racketeering, and money-laundering.149 In May
144. GeorgeJ. Church, TheDevil They Knew, TIMEJan. 15, 1990, at 28. In addition to
providing intelligence, Noriega assisted the Reagan Administration in aiding the Nica-
raguan contras in their fight against the Communist Sandinista government. Id.; MAR-
GARET E. SCRANTON, THE NORIEGAYEARS: U.S.-PANAMANIAN RELATIONS, 1981-1990, at 79-
80 (1991). Noriega also occasionally assisted U.S. authorities in drug seizures and
arrests. Church, supra, at 28; Seymour M. Hersh, The Creation of a Thug Our Man in
Panama, LIFE, Mar. 1990, at 81, 90, 93.
145. In 1955, the Army's 470th Military Intelligence Group recruited Noriega as a
teenager to provide information on his classmates at a Peruvian military school. Hersh,
supra note 144, at 83. In 1971, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency also put Noriega on
its payroll; ironically, Noriega was then in charge of Panamanian intelligence. ScRAN-
TON, supra note 144, at 13-14. In 1986, both the Army and the C.I.. discontinued their
payments to Noriega, after having paid him a combined total of $322,226 over thirty
years. DavidJohnston, U.S. Admits Payments to Noriega, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 19, 1991, § 1, at
14. See also Noriega's Lawyers Say He Got Rich by Spying, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1994, at A22
(reporting claims by Noriega's lawyers that U.S. intelligence agencies had paid Noriega
more than $10 million to spy for the United States).
146. Noriega allegedly provided intelligence on American military activities to Cuba
and supplied arms to the Sandinistas and leftist rebels in Colombia and El Salvador.
Church, supra note 144, at 28; Hersh, supra note 144, at 88.
147. Church, supra note 144, at 28.
148. In 1984, Noriega used his power to dictate the results of the first presidential
election in Panama in sixteen years. Through violence, fraud, and other electoral mis-
conduct, Noriega's supporters ensured the election of Ardito Barletta, the candidate of
the military-supported party. SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 75-76;Jan Knippers Black &
Edmundo Flores, Historical Setting in PANAMA: A CouNTRY STUDY 3, 62-64 (Sandra W.
Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 1989). However, the Panama Defense Force
(P.D.F.) ousted Barletta after he called for an investigation into the murder of Dr.
Hugo Spadafora, a long-time critic of Noriega. SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 85-87.
After only eleven months in office, Barletta was succeeded by his vice-president, Eric
Arturo Delvalle. Id. at 90. Delvalle was originally a Noriega lackey, but he later turned
against Noriega after pressure from opposition leaders and the United States. Id. at
129. When Delvalle tried to fire Noriega from his position as head of the P.D.F. in
1989, the Noriega-controlled legislature ousted Delvalle. Id. at 130-31.
149. Richard Lacayo, Noriega on Ice, TIME, Jan. 15, 1990, at 24, 25; SCRANTON, supra
note 144, at 128. The indictments included charges that Noriega accepted a $4.6 mil-
lion bribe from the Medellin drug cartel to protect cocaine shipments and launder the
cartel's money in Panamanian banks, permitted the cartel to shift its operations to Pan-
ama after Colombia cracked down on drug trafficking, sheltered international drug
smugglers in Panama, and attempted to smuggle 1.4 million pounds of marijuana into
the United States after accepting a $1.1 million bribe to do so. Lacayo, supa, at 24;
SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 128.
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1989, Noriega nullified the results of his country's democratic presidential
elections and installed his own man in the position.150 The legitimate win-
ner and his running-mates were beaten terribly by Noriega loyalists. 15 1
At first, the United States attempted to get rid of Noriega by imposing
economic sanctions,152 attempting to negotiate his resignation, 155 and
even undertaking five covert actions against him'14-all without suc-
cess.15 5 On December 15, 1989, Noriega's hand-picked legislature
appointed him as head of government, with the title "Maximum
Leader."' 5 6 The legislature also declared that a "state of war" existed
150. Jill Smolowe, Panama's Would-BePresiden4 TIME,Jan. 1, 1990, at 30. The election
pitted the pro-Noriega Coalition of National Liberation, whose candidate was Carlos
Duque, a business partner of Noriega, against the anti-Noriega Civil Opposition Demo-
cratic Alliance, whose candidate was Guillermo Endara, a labor lawyer. Id. at 30; ScRAN.
TON, supra note 144, at 159; Black & Flores, supra note 148, at xxxvi. After exit polls
showed a landslide victory for the opposition, the P.D.F. stole the election for Duque.
SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 162. After violently suppressing demonstrations, see infra
note 151 and accompanying text, Noriega nullified the election in its entirety, ScRAN-
TON, supra note 144, at 164, and selected a former high school classmate as provisional
president. Id. at 169.
151. The P.D.F. and the paramilitary Dignity Battalions viciously attacked the legiti-
mate winner and his supporters when they demonstrated against Noriega. SCRANTON,
supra note 144, at 163. Endara's bodyguard was killed, as was the bodyguard of Guil-
lermo ("Billy") Ford, the legitimate Second Vice President. Id. at 163. Endara twice
landed in the hospital with head injuries. Id. at 163-64.
152. In 1988, the United States froze Panama's assets in the United States and sus-
pended all U.S. economic and military aid. I& at 139. President Bush extended the
economic sanctions after taking office in 1989. Id. at 156.
153. In the latter half of 1987, Panama's consul general in New York,Jos6 I. Bland6n,
served as an intermediary in negotiations between Noriega and the United States. The
idea was to offer Noriega a "golden parachute," allowing Noriega to keep his ill-gotten
wealth if he relinquished his power. Id. at 118. Although Noriega had initiated the
negotiations, id., he rejected the final plan and fired Bland6n. Id. at 127. Deals were
also proposed to Noriega by U.S. Admiral Daniel J. Murphy (Ret.), id. at 121-24, and
officials from the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. See id at 126-27, 147-48, 149-
52.
154. The Reagan and Bush Administrations authorized five covert operations in
1988 and 1989. Id. at 153. Little information is known about "Panama 1" and "Panama
2"; they are thought to have involved funding the Panamanian opposition's political
activities and encouraging dissident officers to overthrow Noriega. Id. "Panama 3" was
a coup plan that was abandoned after information about it leaked to the press. Id. at
153-55. "Panama 4" provided funds to the opposition for the 1989 Panamanian presi-
dential election, see supra notes 151-52, but was also abandoned due to news leaks. Id. at
157-58.
"Panama 5" occurred after a domestic coup failed in October 1989. See id. at 185-91.
Little is known about "Panama 5," but it may have been related to one of two covert
U.S. actions in late 1989. In November, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug
Enforcement Administration agents secretly raided a warehouse in Panama City,
expecting to find a stockpile of explosives and terrorist devices. Upon seizing those
items, the United States reportedly would have launched a military operation against
Noriega. Instead, the agents found the warehouse to be empty, so the plan was
aborted. Id. at 195. In December, Noriega evaded U.S. Special Forces attempting to
seize and bring him to the United States for trial. Id.
155. George J, Church, ShouingMude, TIME, Jan. 1, 1990, at 20, 23.
156. SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 197. The legislature also granted Noriega the
power to overrule the civilian president, appoint government officials, direct foreign
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between the United States and Panama.15 7 On the next day, Panamanian
soldiers killed an American serviceman,' 5 8 wounded another, 159 and
detained and beat a third 160 while threatening his wife with gang rape. 161
For President Bush, "That was enough."' 62
On December 20, 1989, 24,000 American troops invaded Panama. 163
American forces quickly overwhelmed Noriega's troops and took com-
mand of most of the small country.' 64 After hiding in the Vatican embassy
for eleven days,165 Noriega finally surrendered to American authorities. 166
He was arrested, flown to the United States, and placed in a Miami jail to
affairs, and convene the legislature and cabinet-all powers he had exercised for years
behind the scenes. Id.
157. Church, supra note 155, at 23.
158. SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 198. Members of the Macho de Monte ("wild hog")
unit of the P.D.F. fired on an American vehicle driving through a P.D.F. checkpoint. A
bullet hit Marine Lt. Robert Paz in the spine and killed him. THOMAS DONNELLY Ex AL.,
OPERATIONJUST CAUSE: THE STORMING OF PANAMA 94 (1991).
159. A bullet also grazed the ankle of another Marine officer. DONNELLY, supra note
158, at 94.
160. SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 199. After a U.S. Navy officer and his wife wit-
nessed the killing of Lt. Paz, see supra note 158, the Macho de Monte took them to a P.D.F.
office. There, a senior P.D.F. officer beat the American serviceman and threatened to
kill him. SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 199. P.D.F. officers threw his wife against a wall,
cutting her head, and threatened her with sexual abuse. DONNELLY ET At, supra note
158, at 94-95.
161. Church, supra note 155, at 23.
162. Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama,
1989 PUB. PAPERS 1722, 1723 (Dec. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Panama Address].
163. Church, supra note 155, at 21. Immediately prior to the invasion, the democrat-
ically elected leaders of Panama-President-Elect Guillermo Endara, First Vice Presi-
dent-Elect Ricardo Arias Calder6n, and Second Vice President-Elect Guillermo Ford-
were inaugurated at a U.S. military base, where they remained for the next thirty-six
hours. Smolowe, supra note 150, at 30.
164. Ed Magnuson, SowingDragon s Teeth, TIME,Jan. 1, 1990, at 24. For details on the
fighting, see generally DONNELLY ET A., supra note 159. During the invasion, 23 Ameri-
can soldiers and over 600 Panamanian soldiers were killed. GeorgeJ. Church, No Place
to Run, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 38, 39. In addition, between 300 and 800 Panamanian
civilians died. Ed Magnuson, Passing the Manhood Test, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 43. More-
over, the invasion caused $2 billion in economic damages to Panama. Church, supra, at
39.
165. Ed Magnuson, A Guest Who Wore Out His Welcome, TIME, Jan. 15, 1990, at 26. For
five days, U.S. Special Forces chased Noriega and his entourage throughout Panama,
unable to catch him. DONNELLY ET At., supra note 158, at 105; SCRANTON, supra note
144, at 205. U.S. forces also surrounded foreign embassies where Noriega might have
sought refuge. Id. After running out of places to hide, Noriega went to the Papal Nun-
ciature (Vatican embassy) on December 24, 1989. Id. He telephoned MonsignorJos6
Sebastian Laboa, the Vatican's Ambassador to Panama, from a Dairy Queen in Panama
City requesting asylum. When Noriega reminded Laboa ofJoseph and Mary's similar
difficulties in finding a place to stay many Christmas Eves before, the Papal Nuncio
decided that he could not refuse Noriega's request. Church, supra note 164, at 40.
Thus, Laboa sent a car to pick up Panama's "Maximum Leader," who arrived at the
embassy wearing only a t-shirt and running shorts and carrying two AK-47 rifles. DON-
NELLY ET AL., supra note 158, at 112.
166. Lacayo, supra note 150, at 24. Because of the Vatican's tradition of granting
sanctuary to those fleeing prosecution, Laboa tried to convince Noriega to leave the
embassy on his own. Magnuson, supra note 165, at 26. However, Noriega decided to
surrender on the evening ofJanuary 3, 1990, only after a huge anti-Noriega demonstra-
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await trial.1 67 In April 1992, a jury found Noriega guilty on eight drug
counts,1 68 and he is currently serving a forty-year prison sentence.
16 9
President Bush stated that the goals of Operation Just Cause, as the
U.S. invasion was called, were "to safeguard the lives of Americans, to
defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect
the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty."170 As legal justification for the
invasion, the United States invoked Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 17 1 Arti-
cle 21 of the Organization of American States Charter,172 and Article 4 of
the Panama Canal Treaty.173
tion immediately outside the embassy made clear the potential consequences of
remaining in Panama. Id. at 27.
167. Id.; DONNELLY Er At., supra note 158, at 365.
168. Go Directly toJail TIME, Apr. 20, 1992, at 22.
169. Trial Begins on Charges Noriega Ordered Killing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 1994,
at A8. See also U.S. v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 803 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that the
Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War allowed the United
States to incarcerate Noriega in a federal penitentiary, as long as the United States
provided Noriega with the full benefits of the Convention during his confinement). In
addition, on March 3, 1994, a Panamanian jury found Noriega guilty of ordering the
murder of Moises Giroldi, the rebel army major who had led the unsuccessful October
1989 coup attempt. See supra note 154;Jury Convicts Noriega, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 5,
1994, at A29. Noriega was tried in absentia. Id.
170. Panama Address, supra note 162, at 1722.
171. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate on United States Military Action in Panama, 1989 PUB. PAPERs
1734 (Dec. 21, 1989); U.N. Doc. S/21035 (1989) (letter from Thomas Pickering, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations).
172. See Robert Graham, IntenationalJurists Question GroundsforAmerican Action, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1989, § 1, at 6. The Organization of American States (OA.S.) is a
regional organization composed of 33 North American, Central American, South
American, Latin American, and Caribbean countries. 0. CARLOS STOE ZER, THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 1 (2d ed. 1993). It was established in 1948 to
strengthen the peace and security of the region, solve political, legal, and economic
disputes, and promote the economic, social, and cultural development of its members.
Id. at 31; O.A.S. CiARTER art. 2. In the summer of 1989, the OAS. tried without suc-
cess to persuade Noriega to give up his power. SCRANTON, supra note 144, at 168-69.
Article 21 of the OAS. Charter, cited by the United States to justify intervention in
Panama, provides: "The American States bind themselves in their international rela-
tions not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in
accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof." OAS. CHRTER art. 21.
However, on December 22, 1989, the OAS. condemned the U.S. invasion. See Resolu-
tion on Serious Events in the Republic of Panama, OEA/Series.G, CP/Res. 534 (800/
89), Corr. 1 (Dec. 22, 1989). The vote was 20 in favor of condemnation and one
opposed (the United States), with six abstentions. STOETZER, supra, at 174-75.
173. See U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2899th mtg. at 34, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2899 (1989)
(statement by Thomas Pickering, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations). The 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty gave the United States "in perpetuity...
the use, occupation, and control" of territory for the construction, operation, and pro-
tection of an international waterway through the isthmus of Panama. See Isthmian
Canal Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, U.S.-Panama, art. 1, 33 Stat. 2234, 2234-35. The 1978
Panama Canal Treaty provides for the transfer of the canal to Panama at noon on
December 31, 1999. See Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Panama, art. 2, para.
2, art. 13, para. 1, 33 U.S.T. 47, 50, 75-76. The treaty established formal procedures for
the gradual transition from American to Panamanian ownership. See id. arts. 3, 13.
Article 4 requires the United States (as well as Panama) to protect and defend the
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On December 23, 1989, in the midst of the fighting, the Security
Council considered a draft resolution proposed by Algeria, Colombia,
Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia. 174 The resolution
stated that the Security Council "[s]trongly deplores" the U.S. action,
called the invasion "a flagrant violation of international law and of the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States," and
demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Panama.1 75 The United States, Great Britain, and France
vetoed the draft resolution.176 Nevertheless, six days later, the General
Assembly passed a similar resolution condemning the U.S. action. 177
3. The Great Power Veto
The U.N. response to American military action in both Libya' 78 and
Panama 79 illustrates the tension between national self-defense under
international law and the so-called "Great Power Veto."' 80 In both situa-
tions, the United States used its veto as a means to frustrate the limits on
self-defense as established by Article 51 and U.N. practice.' 8 ' A discerni-
ble pattern has recently emerged: the United States perceives a threat
from an aggressor state, responds with unilateral military force, cites Arti-
cle 51 to justify its action, and then vetoes a draft Security Council resolu-
tion condemning its action.' 8 2 Thus, understanding the scope of the veto
Canal "to meet the danger resulting from an armed attack or other actions which
threaten the security of the Panama Canal or of ships transiting it." Id. art. 4, para. 1.
174. See U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2902d mtg. at 18-20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2902 (1989).
175. U.N. Doc. S/21048, at 1 (1989) (draft resolution).
176. See U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2902d mtg. at 18-20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2902 (1989).
The result of the voting was 10 votes in favor (Algeria, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ethio-
pia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia) and four votes
opposed (Canada, France, Great Britain, and the United States), with one abstention
(Finland). Id.
177. GA. Res. 44/240, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/
44/240 (1989). This resolution was adopted 75-20, with 40 abstentions. Assembly
Demands Immediate Halt of United States Intervention in Panama, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1990,
at 67. See alsoJ. T. Nguyen, U.N. Condemns U.S. Military Action in Panama, U.P.I., Dec. 29,
1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. For the scholarly debate on the
legality of the invasion, see generally Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under Inter-
national Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1991); Abraham D.
Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 COLuM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281
(1991); Ruth Wedgwood, The Use of Armed Force in International Affairs: Self-Defense and
the Panama Invasion, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 609 (1991).
178. See supra part III.B.1.
179. See supra part III.B.2.
180. See Schachter, supra note 103, at 263-64.
181. See supra notes 142, 176 and accompanying text.
182. The United States followed this pattern in bombing Libya, see supra part III.B.I.,
and invading Panama, see supra part II.B.2. The United States also vetoed Security
Council resolutions condemning its invasion of Grenada and its shooting down of two
Libyan reconnaissance aircraft. See U.N. Doc. S.16067/Res.1 (1983); U.N. SCOR, 41st
Sess., 2491st mtg. at 197-98, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2491 (1986); U.N. Doc. S/20378 (1989);
U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2841st mtg. at 48, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2841 (1989). Similarly, the
United States used its veto to block resolutions condemning Israel for intercepting a
Libyan aircraft believed to have been transporting Palestinian terrorists and for attack-
ing Lebanon. See U.N. Doc. S/17796/Rev.1 (1986) (revised draft resolution); U.N.
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power is important because of its potential to vitiate international restric-
tions on the use of force in national self-defense.
The United Nations is composed of six principal organs: the General
Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the
Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secreta-
riat.183 The U.N. Charter gives the Security Council "primary responsibil-
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security." 18 4 The
Security Council consists of fifteen members-five permanent members
and ten non-permanent members.' 8 5 The five permanent members are
the People's Republic of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.' 8 6 The ten non-permanent members serve rotating
SCOR, 41st Sess., 2655th mtg. at 114, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2655 (1986); U.N. Doc. S/20322
(1988); U.N. SCOR, 43rd Sess., 2832d mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2832 (1988).
The other superpower, the former Soviet Union, followed the same pattern. See, e.g.,
U.N. Doc. S/8761 (1968); U.N. Doc. S/8761/Add.1 (1968); U.N. SCOR, 23rd Sess.,
1443rd mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1443 (1968) (Soviet Union veto of draft resolution
condemning its invasion of Czechoslovakia); U.N. Doc. S/13729 (1980); U.N. SCOR,
35th Sess., 2190th mtg. at 57, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2190 (1980) (Soviet Union veto of draft
resolution condemning its invasion of Afghanistan).
183. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, 1.
184. Id. art. 24, 1. The Security Council can investigate international disputes, id.
art. 34, call on the parties to settle the dispute by peaceful means, id. art. 33, 2,
recommend solutions, id. art. 36, 1, require the parties to comply with provisional
measures, id. art. 40, impose sanctions, id. art. 41, and take military action, id. art. 42.
185. Id. art. 23, 1. The Security Council originally consisted of 11 members: five
permanent members and six non-permanent members. The General Assembly
amended the U.N. Charter in 1963 to increase the size of the Security Council. See G.A.
Res. 1991, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., 1285th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 15, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/
5515 (1963) [hereinafter Equitable Representation Resolution]. Recent proposals to
increase the size of the Security Council further have not yet been adopted. See Barbara
Crossette, At the U.N., a Drive for Diversity, N.Y. TimEs, OCt 24, 1994, at A6; Evelyn Leo-
pold, Russian Flag Replaces Soviet Hammer and Sickle Banner at U.N., Reuters, Dec. 27,
1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews File; Masahiko Ishizuka, Security
Council Issue Cuts to Heart ofJapan's Global Role, Nin i WKLY., July 11, 1994, at 7.
186. U.N. CHARTER art 23, 1. Interestingly, the language of the U.N. Charter does
not accurately reflect current geopolitical reality. The Charter states that "the Republic
of China" is one of the permanent members of the Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art.
23, 1. When the United Nations was established in 1945, mainland China (presently
the "People's Republic of China") was one of the permanent members of the Security
Council. In 1949, Communists seized control of mainland China, and the Nationalist
government fled to the island of Taiwan. From 1949 until 1971, Taiwan was the official
representative of "China" at the United Nations and on the Security Council. YODER,
supra note 10, at 36. In 1971, the General Assembly voted to recognize the People's
Republic of China as the official representative of China and restore its original rights
and powers as a permanent member of the Security Council. See GA Res. 2758, U.N.
GAOR, 26th Sess., 1976th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). Yet
the U.N. Charter still reads "Republic of China" because of the cumbersome amend-
ment process. YODER, supra note 10, at 37. See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 108-109 (outlin-
ing the amendment process).
The U.N. Charter also states that "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" is one of
the permanent members of the Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, 1. When the
Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, the Russian Federation inherited the former
Soviet Union's position in the United Nations. Leopold, supra note 185, at 1. The
transition was accomplished with a letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to U.N.
Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar rather than by Charter amendment because
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two-year terms and are not eligible for immediate re-election.18 7 In con-
trast to the Security Council, the General Assembly consists of representa-
tives from every nation that is a member of the United Nations. 188 Its
major functions are to discuss and propose solutions to international
problems,189 consider and approve the budget of the United Nations and
its agencies,' 9 0 and supervise the work of the Security Council and other
U.N. organs.191
Each member of the Security Council has one vote.' 9 2 Decisions on
procedural matters require the affirmative vote of any nine members of
the Council. 193 However, decisions on all other matters require the
affirmative vote of nine members, including all of the permanent mem-
bers.' 9 4 This is the "Great Power Veto": a substantive proposal fails ifjust
one of the permanent members votes against it, regardless of how many
other members of the Council vote for the proposal. 195 The five perma-
nent members, who had won World War II and then labored to establish
an international organization to maintain the hard-fought peace, had
been simply unwilling to join the United Nations without this
protection.' 9 6
Yet in 1950, the United Nations instituted a procedure for resolving
international crises when a veto prevents the Security Council from act-
ing.197 In such a situation, the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution requires
the General Assembly to consider the matter and recommend collective
measures.19 8 However, action by the General Assembly under the Resolu-
of fear of opening up a Pandora's Box of other large countries claiming rights to per-
manent membership on the Security Council. Id.
187. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, 2. The ten non-permanent members consist of five
representatives of Africa and Asia, two from Latin America, one from Eastern Europe,
and two from Western Europe and other areas. Equitable Representation Resolution,
supra note 185, at 22.
188. U.N. CHARTER art. 9, 1.
189. See id. arts. 10-14.
190. Id. art. 17.
191. Id. art. 15.
192. Id. art. 27, 1.
193. Id. art. 27, 1 2.
194. Id. art. 27, 3.
195. The Security Council does not treat a permanent member's abstention from
voting as a veto. SYDNEY D. BAILEY, VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 69 (1969). Thus, it
is possible for the Security Council to adopt a resolution without the affirmative vote of
any of the permanent members. Id. at 73.
196. RUSSELL, supra note 21, at 714-15, 964. In particular, "American officials were
not prepared to ask Congress and the public to commit the United States to major
international actions, including the use of force, on the vote of other nations." Id. at
964.
197. See GA Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 302nd plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, at 10,
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
198. Id. The Resolution states, in relevant part:
[I]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent mem-
bers, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall
consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommen-
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don is an inadequate substitute for action by the Security Council. Unlike
the Security Council, the General Assembly depends on the voluntary
cooperation of the members to carry out its recommended action.19 9 As a
result, "decisions [of the General Assembly] do not have precisely the
same teeth as was intended by the founders [as] action by the Security
Council."200 Therefore, an American president ordering the use of force
in self-defense need not worry about satisfying all of the requirements
established by Article 51 and U.N. practice. He knows that he can effec-
tively prevent the Security Council from taking any action on the issue or,
more likely, condemning the United States. The veto is the final weapon
to be used in the operation; condemnation by the General Assembly
occurs after the operation has been initiated and is thus too late to pre-
vent it.20 1 Significantly, the United States did not have to exercise its veto
after attacking Iraq in response to the Bush assassination attempt, because
the Security Council did not consider taking any action whatsoever.
202
IV. The Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush
A. Background
1. The Gulf War
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait 2 03 The invasion began only
hours after Iraq withdrew from negotiations to settle a variety of financial
and territorial disputes with its Persian Gulf neighbor.2 0 4 President Bush
dations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of
the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to main-
tain or restore international peace and security.
Id. The Resolution also provides for the convening of emergency sessions of the Gen-
eral Assembly on 24 hours' notice, either by the vote of any seven (now nine) members
of the Security Council or by a majority of the U.N. members. Id. The Security Coun-
cil's referral of a matter to the General Assembly is not subject to the veto. RICHARD
Hiscocxs, THE SECURITY COUNCIL: A STUDY IN ADOLESCENCE 291 (1973).
199. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE U.N. CHARTER, 83D CONG., 2D SEss., THE PROBLEM or
THE VETO IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 11 (Comm. Print 1954) [hereinaf-
ter Senate Veto Report]. However, Security Council decisions are only legally binding
in the rare case when the Council makes them so. Schachter, supra note 110, at 122.
200. Senate Veto Report, supra note 199, at 11.
201. Of course, there are political costs in exercising the veto and in being con-
demned by the General Assembly. See Schacter, supra note 110, at 121-23; BAILEY, supra
note 195, at 10.
202. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
203. ARTHUR H. BLAIR, AT WAR IN THE GULF: A CHRONOLOGY 3 (1992). See also Lisa
Beyer, Iraq's Power Grab, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990 at 16, 19. Justifying the invasion, Saddam
Hussein claimed that a revolutionary group had overthrown the Emir of Kuwait and
invited Iraqi intervention. Id. at 19.
204. Beyer, supra note 203, at 18-19. On August 1, 1990, Iraq and Kuwait held nego-
tiations to discuss all of Iraq's complaints against its neighbor to the southeast. The
issues discussed included Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's claims that Kuwait had
depressed the price of oil through overproduction, costing Iraq $7 billion each year,
that Kuwait had stolen the Rumaila oil field along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, that Kuwait
should forgive the billions of dollars that it had loaned to Iraq, and that all of Kuwait
actually belonged to Iraq. Not surprisingly, the negotiations broke down after only two
hours. Id. See also RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
Vol. 28
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ordered American troops and warplanes to defend Saudi Arabia, which
was feared to be Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's next target.2 0 5 Declar-
ing that "[a] line has been drawn in the sand,"20 6 Bush assumed leader-
ship of the nearly unanimous international effort to force Iraq out of
Kuwait.20 7 The U.N. Security Council immediately condemned the inva-
sion,20 8 declared Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void,20 9 and
demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw its
forces.2 10 The Security Council also imposed mandatory economic sanc-
tions on Iraq2 1 1 and relied on the United States and other naval powers
for enforcement of the sanctions.2
12
Over the next several months, as the crisis intensified,2 1 3 the interna-
COUNCIL (1946-1992): A THEMATIC GUIDE 507-08 (Karel C. Wellens ed., 1993) [herein-
after RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS]; LESTER H. BRUNE, AMERICA AND THE IRAQI CRISIS,
1990-1992: ORIGINS AND AFrERMATH 21-42 (1993).
205. Michael Kramer, Read My Ships, TIME, Aug. 20, 1990, at 18, 21. In July 1968,
Iraq's Baath ("Arab Socialist Resurrection") Party gained power in a coup d'tat. Eric
Hooglund, Government and Politics in IRA: A COUNTRY STUDY 175 (Helen Chapin Metz
ed., 1990). In 1979, Saddam Hussein assumed leadership of the party in his own coup.
BRUNE, supra note 204, at 13. As Baath leader, Hussein became president of Iraq and
commander-in-chief of its armed forces. Hooglund, supra, at 178. By invading Kuwait,
Hussein controlled 20% of the world's oil; invading Saudi Arabia would have given him
60% of the world's oil and regional dominance. BRUNE, supra note 204, at 53.
206. War in the Middle East: How We Went to War, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,Jan. 17, 1991,
at A8 (quoting President Bush).
207. Kramer, supra note 205, at 21; Lisa Beyer, The World Closes In, TIME, Aug. 20,
1990, at 26. To the surprise of many observers, the international coalition even
included most Arab states. SeeJill Smolowe, Me and My Brother Against My Cousin, TIME,
Aug. 20, 1990, at 33. See also infra note 214.
208. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990) [hereinafter Resolution 660]. This resolution was adopted on the day of the
invasion by a vote of 14-0, with one abstention (Yemen). REsoLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS,
supra note 204, at 508. For an analysis of U.N. actions during the Gulf War in the
context of the right of collective self-defense under Article 51, see David R. Penna, The
Right to Self-Defense in the Post-Cold War Era: The Role of the United Nations, 20 DENy. J.
INT'L L. & POL'v 41 (1991); Thomas K. Plofchan,Jr., Article 51: Limits on Self-Defense?, 13
U. MICH.J. INT'L L. 336 (1992).
209. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662
(1990) [hereinafter Resolution 662]. This resolution was adopted on August 9, 1990 by
a vote of 15-0. RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 204, at 509. Hussein had
declared a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait. See Resolution 662, supra,
at 1.
210. Resolution 660, supra note 208, at 1.
211. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990). The Security Council prohibited all trade with (except for medical and human-
itarian purposes) and the transfer of funds to Iraq and Kuwait. Id. This resolution was
adopted on August 6, 1990 by a vote of 13-0, with two abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).
RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS, supranote 204, at 509. The United States, the European
Community, and Japan also froze Kuwait's $100 billion in foreign assets in order to
keep them out of Hussein's hands. Beyer, supra note 207, at 29.
212. See S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
665 (1990). This resolution was adopted on August 25, 1990 by a vote of 13-0, with two
abstentions (Yemen and Cuba). RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 204, at 511.
See also Beyer, supra note 207, at 28.
213. The Iraqi forces plundered Kuwait and committed a number of war crimes
against Kuwaiti nationals. RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 204, at 511. See
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tional coalition against Iraq massed its forces in the Persian Gulf. 2 14 On
November 29, 1990, the Security Council approved a resolution authoriz-
ing the use of force against Iraq unless Saddam Hussein withdrew from
Kuwait byJanuary 15, 1991.215 Because the deadline passed without Iraqi
compliance, the coalition forces began bombing military targets through-
out Iraq on January 16, 1991.216 The ground war began on February 23,
1991, when the international coalition invaded Iraq and Kuwait.21 7
Incredibly, the coalition forces achieved victory within 100 hours21 8 by
also S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990)
(condemning those actions). In addition, Iraq held hostage thousands of foreigners
who had been in Iraq and Kuwait at the time of the invasion, including over 3000
Americans. Ed Magnuson, Saddams Strongest Card, TIME, Aug. 27, 1990, at 24, 24-25.
The Western hostages were taken to military and civilian installations to be used as
"human shields" against a military attack. Id.; War in the Middle East, supra note 206, at
A8. The Security Council repeatedly demanded the release of all third state nationals.
See S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/664
(1990); S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/667
(1990); S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674
(1990).
As all of this was occurring, a variety of attempts at negotiating a peaceful resolution
were failing. See Lisa Beyer, Pausing at the Rim of the Abyss, TIME, Sept. 10, 1990, at 20;
GeorgeJ. Church, Saddam's Strategies, TIME, Oct. 1, 1990, at 50, 51; GeorgeJ. Church,
The Waiting Gamen, TIME, OCL 15, 1990, at 50, 51.
214. The coalition forces consisted of 737,000 men and women in ground units,
aboard 190 vessels, and flying or maintaining 1800 aircraft. Although the coalition was
composed of troops from 34 different nations, the United States provided most of the
troops, ships, and aircraft. BLAIR, supra note 203, at 125. See alsoJames Walsh, A Partner-
ship to Remember, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 49-50.
215. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990) [hereinafter Resolution 678]. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 12-2
(Yemen and Cuba), with one abstention (China). REsOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS, supra
note 204, at 514. The text of the resolution actually authorized the use of "all necessary
means to uphold and implement [the previous resolutions relating to the crisis] and to
restore international peace and security in the area." Resolution 678, supra; at 1
(emphasis added). After the Security Council passed this resolution, Saddam released
the hostages. Dan Goodgame, "What If We Do Nothing?", TIME, Jan. 7, 1991, at 22, 24.
Following a flurry of unsuccessful last-minute diplomatic initiatives by the United States
and other countries, the U.S. Congress voted to support the war resolution. See Lisa
Beyer, Last Chance to Talk, TIME, Jan. 14, 1991, at 15, 15-16; Lisa Beyer, Last Gasps on the
Negotiation Trail TIME, Jan. 21, 1991, at 30, 30-31; Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. 102-1, 105 Star. 3 (1991); Richard Lacayo, A
Reluctant Go-Ahead, TIME, Jan. 21, 1991, at 32.
216. GeorgeJ. Church, SoFar, So Good, TIME,Jan. 28, 1991, at 18, 20-22. The initial
targets included command-and-control centers, air bases, ballistic missile launchers,
radar, facilities, and chemical and nuclear warfare factories. Id. at 20-21; BRUNE, supra
note 204, at 108-09; BLAIR, supra note 203, at 77. By eliminating those targets first, the
coalition forces destroyed Iraq's air defenses and limited the ability of Iraqi forces to
withstand a ground attack. Id. at 77.
217. BRUNE, supra note 204, at 115. On February 22, 1991, President Bush gave Hus-
sein an ultimatum: begin withdrawing from Kuwait within 24 hours or face a coalition
invasion to liberate Kuwait. Hussein ignored the deadline, so the coalition forces
invaded Kuwait. Id. at 114-15.
218. George J. Church, The 100 Hours, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 22, 24. The quick
coalition victory was contrary to Hussein's earlier prediction of "the mother of all bat-
des" between coalition and Iraqi forces. George J. Church, Saddam's Strategies, supra
note 213, at 50 (quoting Saddam Hussein). In addition, Hussein failed to fulfill his
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destroying the Iraqi army2 19 and forcing Iraq to retreat from Kuwait. 220
On February 27, 1991, President Bush ordered the coalition forces to sus-
pend all offensive operations, effectively ending the war.22 ' Within a few
hours, Iraq informed the United Nations that it would comply with all of
the Security Council resolutions.2 22 Iraq formally accepted the U.N.
cease-fire terms on April 5, 1991.223
2. "Why not just kill Saddam Hussein?"
As these events were unfolding, many commentators discussed whether or
not the United States could quickly resolve the crisis by assassinating the
Iraqi dictator.2 24 One of the proponents of this so-called "common sense"
solution simply asked: "[I]nstead of war, why not just kill Saddam Hus-
promise that Iraq would make the American soldiers "swim in their own blood."
Michael Kramer, The Moments of Truth, Jan. 21, 1991, at 22, 24 (quoting Saddam Hus-
sein). American casualties during the war consisted of 148 combat deaths and 458 com-
bat wounded. BRUNE, supra note 204, at 121. These totals were less than five percent of
the lowest pre-war estimates by the U.S. Department of Defense. Church, The 100
Hours, supra, at 32.
219. In what he compared to football's "Hail Mary" play, General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf, the commander-in-chief of the American military forces in the Persian
Gulf, sent American, British, and French forces north into Iraq to cut off Iraq's elite
Republican Guard units from the front-line Iraqi troops in Kuwait. BRUNE, supra note
204, at 115. This strategy succeeded in deceiving Iraq as to the main point of attack and
in surrounding the Iraqi forces. Church, The 100 Hours, supra note 218, at 24; Sayings of
Stormin' Norman, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 27. The estimates of the number of Iraqis
killed during the war ranged from 25,000 to 100,000. BLAIR, supra note 203, at 116-17.
Iraq, which had the world's fourth largest army before the war, id. at 105, was left with
only an infantry army after the war and was no longer capable of offensive operations.
Church, The 100 Hours, supra note 218, at 31. However, Hussein has since begun to
rebuild his armed forces. U.S. NEWs & WORLD REPORT, TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICrORY-
THE UNREPORTED HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 412 (1992).
220. Church, The 100 Hours, supra note 218, at 31-32. On February 25, 1991, Iraq
began to withdraw from Kuwait City, which coalition forces liberated the following day.
Id. at 80, 31.
221. Church, The 100 Hours, supra note 218, at 31.
222. BLAIR, supra note 203, at 116.
223. BRUNE, supra note 204, at 119. The Security Council set out the cease fire terms
in S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). By
ratifying the peace treaty, Iraq agreed, inter alia, to comply with the 13 resolutions
passed during the crisis; to destroy its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and
allow U.N. inspection teams to verify such actions; to destroy missiles and missile
launchers with a range of over 90 miles; and to pay reparations to Kuwait. See id. How-
ever, the United Nations is still trying to get Iraq to comply fully with these cease-fire
terms. See UN., Doubting Iraq, Declines to Lift Sanctions, N.Y. TiMES, July 12, 1995, at A7;
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Iraq, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 847 (May 17,
1995).
224. See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be a Crime, WASH. POST,
Oct. 7, 1990, at Dl; Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 22, 1990); George J.
Church, Saddam in the Cross Hairs, TIME, Oct. 8, 1990, at 29. See also Chris A. Anderson,
Assassination, Lawful Homicide, and the Butcher of Baghdad, 13 HfuNEJ. PUB. L. & PoL'Y
291 (1992); Boyd M.Johnson, III, Note, Executive Order 12,333: The Permissibility of an
American Assassination of a Foreign Leader, 25 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 401 (1992); Michael N.
Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 Y~ALJ. INT'L L.
609 (1992); Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Confli4 43 MERCER L.
REv. 615 (1992).
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sein? Few would mourn and many lives might be saved .... -225 That
might very well have been true, but both international226 and domestic
law2 27 prohibit assassination. The term "assassination" does not have a
generally accepted definition. 228 This Note adopts the following defini-
tion: "the intentional killing of a specified victim or group of victims, per-
petrated for reasons related to his (her, their) public prominence and
undertaken with a political purpose in view."2 29 Ironically, the term is
derived from the Arabic word hashishiyyin ("deviators"),230 the name for
the members of an eleventh-century Muslim brotherhood devoted to kill-
ing opposing religious and political leaders.23 '
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the use of force in inter-
national affairs,23 2 seems to forbid the assassination of individuals for
political purposes.233 The international rules of warfare contain more
specific prohibitions. The Hague IV Convention (1907) provides that
"[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited,"2 34 and that "it is especially forbidden ... to kill or wound
treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.123 5 In
1956, the U.S. Army interpreted these provisions as applying to acts of
assassination. 23 6 Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions incorporated
the prohibition from the Hague IV Convention. 237
225. Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 22, 1990) (quoting political commenta-
tor Michael Kinsley).
226. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
228. Schmitt, supra note 224, at 611-12. See also Anderson, supra note 224, at 294
(surveying proposed definitions of the term); W. Hays Parks, Memorandum ofLaw: Exec-
utive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMw LAw., Dec. 1989, at 4, 8 (appendix A) (survey-
ing dictionary definitions of the terms "assassinate" and "assassinations"). Black's Law
Dictionary defines "assassination" as "[m] urder committed, usually, though not necessar-
ily, for hire, without direct provocation or cause of resentment given to the murderer by
the person upon whom the crime is committed; though an assassination of a public
figure might be done by one acting alone for personal, social or political reasons."
BLAcK's LAw DiCrIoNARY 114 (6th ed. 1990).
229. FRANKLIN L. FORD, PoLrrcAL MuRDER: FROM TYRANNICIDE To TERRORIsM 2
(1985).
230. Id. at 87, 99.
231. See id. at 101-02.
232. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
233. Parks, supra note 228, at 4; Anderson, supra note 224, at 292.
234. Hague IV Convention, supra note 8, art. 22.
235. Id. art. 23(b).
236. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARmFAR, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, para. 31,
at 17 (1956) [hereinafter Army Field Manual]. The Army Field Manual interpreted
these provisions as "prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or
putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy 'dead
or alive.'" Id. However, the Manual emphasized that they do not "preclude attacks on
individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied
territory, or elsewhere." Id.
237. Article 35 of Protocol I states: "In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to
the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited." Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 35, para.
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American law also forbids assassination attempts against foreign lead-
ers. Executive Order 12,333 states: "No person employed by or acting on
behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to
engage in, assassination. '238 President Gerald Ford originally imple-
mented the ban after a Senate investigation implicated U.S. officials in
assassination plots against several foreign leaders. 23 9 By the time of the
Persian Gulf crisis, four successive U.S. presidents had affirmed the pol-
icy.240 Thus, while President Bush did acknowledge that Hussein's
removal from power certainly would simplify the situation in the Middle
East, he stopped short of explicitly saying that Hussein should be killed.24 1
However, the loopholes that exist in the domestic and international assas-
1 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Article 37 states: "It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture
an adversary by resort to perfidy." Id. art. 37, para. 1.
In 1949, the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva adopted four international conven-
tions on warfare: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
238. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)
[hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,333].
239. Wanting It Both Ways, TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 20. See SELECr COMM1TTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcrrvrnEs, U.S. SEN-
ATE, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS (1976). The Senate
Committee found the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency directly involved in the assassi-
nation of Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo, id. at 191, and in several failed
plots to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, id. at 71. The original ban read: "No
employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
political assassination." Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90, 101 (1976).
240. President Jimmy Carter retained Ford's ban with a slight modification in the
language, in Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112, 129 (1978) ("No person employed
by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to
engage in, assassination.") President Ronald Reagan kept this language in the current
Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 238, which was left standing by
Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton. For a comprehensive study of the current
ban and its application to the Persian Gulf crisis, see generallyJohnson, supra note 224.
241. See, e.g., Daniel Schorr, HypocrisyAbout Assassination, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1991, at
C7; Andrew Alexander, Allies Ponder Saddam's PostwarFa ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Feb. 21,
1991, at A7; Joel Achenbach, Doing In A Dictator, WASH. PoST, Feb. 23, 1991, at D1. As
the United States was preparing for war, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney fired
Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan for publicly suggesting that the United
States was planning to target Hussein and his family. Bruce van Voorst, Ready, Aim,
Fired, TIME, OCt. 1, 1990, at 55.
In spite of Bush's statements, there are reports that the United States did in fact try to
kill Hussein during the Gulf War. See Brian Duffy, Hollow Vitry, U.S. Nrvs & WORLD
REP.,Jan. 20, 1992, at 40, 42 ("[I]n the final hours of the war... two U.S. Air Force F-
111F aircraft dropped specially designed 5,000-pound bombs on an Iraqi command
bunker 15 miles northwest of Baghdad in a last-ditch effort to kill the Iraqi leader.");
The Last-gasp Effort to Get Saddam, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 1992, at 42, 42-43
(describing in detail the U.S. attempt to kill Saddam Hussein during the war). Such
attempts, if true, were obviously unsuccessful.
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sination bans provided for many interesting discussions.24 2
3. Postwar Tensions
After the war, Hussein continued to cause problems for the international
community by refusing to cooperate with U.N. efforts to inspect Iraq's
nuclear facilities.24 3 In addition, in an effort to retain power, he ordered
offensives to defeat rebellions by Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish tribes. 244 In
order to protect and assist the rebels, the United States and its allies estab-
lished "no-fly" zones in northern and southern Iraq, in which they pledged
to shoot down any Iraqi warplanes. 245
After President Bush was defeated in his 1992 re-election bid, Hussein
attempted to take advantage of the presidential transition by violating the
242. See, e.g., Church, supra note 224, at 29. Johnson, supra note 224, lists four ways
in which a U.S. president could evade the international and domestic bans and legally
order the assassination of a foreign leader:
(1) Ask Congress to declare war, in which case a foreign leader exercising com-
mand responsibility would become a legitimate target;
(2) Construe Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to permit the assassina-
tion of a foreign leader based on either a right to self-defense or a right to
respond to criminal activities;
(3) Narrowly interpret [Executive Order 12,333] as not restricting the Presi-
dent as long as he does not approve specific plans for the killing of individuals;
or
(4) Overrule the order, create an exception to it, or permit the Congress to do
the same.
Id. at 403 (citations omitted).
By the time of the Persian Gulf crisis, the Bush Administration had already reinter-
preted Executive Order 12,333 as not applying in situations when the United States
takes or supports actions that result in the accidental or unintended killing of a foreign
leader. See David B. Ottaway & Don Oberdorfer, Administration Alters Assassination Ban,
WASH. PosT Nov. 4, 1989, at Al. See alsoJohnson, supra note 224, at 423-26 (discussing
the events leading up to the reinterpretation of the domestic ban). Former Vice Presi-
dent Dan Quayle has recently called for the rescission of Executive Order 12,333 "so
that the President would have one more option in extraordinary circumstances." DAN
QUAYLE, STANDING FtRM: A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL MEMOIR 216 (1994). The late former
president Richard Nixon has made similar statements. See Nixon Interview (CNN televi-
sion broadcast, Jan. 15, 1992). In any event, aside from the legal obstacles, killing Hus-
sein would have presented numerous practical problems. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, A Show
of Strength, TIME, Oct. 24, 1994, at 34, 38; Michael Kramer, The Cost of Removing Suddam,
TIME, Oct. 14, 1994, at 39.
243. REsOLUTIoNs AND STATEMENTs, supra note 204, at 521-22, 525-27. See also Cheat
and Retreat for the Umpteenth Time, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 16. Iraq violated other provi-
sions of the peace treaty as well. See REsOLuTIONS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 204, at
521-27.
244. BRUNE, supra note 204, at 126. After the war ended, the Kurds rebelled in
northern Iraq and Iraqi Shiites rebelled in southern Iraq. TRIUMPH WroUT VIcTORY,
supra note 219, at 399. The Kurds are the largest non-Arab ethnic minority in Iraq and
have fought for an independent homeland almost since the founding of the Republic
of Iraq in 1958. Stephen Pelletiere, The Society and Its Environment, in IRAQ A COUNTRY
STUDY 69, 82, 84 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1990). Shiite Muslims constitute over half of
Iraq's total population. BRUNE, supra note 204, at 15. In contrast, Saddam Hussein and
the Baath leadership are Sunni Muslims, which constitute a minority of the total popula-
tion of Iraq. Id.
245. BRUNE, supra note 204, at 127, 129.
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"no-fly" zones.24 6 In December of 1992 and January of 1993, American
fighter jets shot down several Iraqi MiGs that had entered the zones.24 7
Hussein responded by installing surface-to-air missiles to shoot down allied
planes enforcing the prohibitions. 24 8 In addition, he banned U.N. inspec-
tion teams from flying into Iraq249 and sent Iraqi troops into Kuwait to
steal weapons and equipment.250
Consequently, the United States, Britain, and France launched air 25 1
and missile25 2 attacks against military targets in Iraq.253 The attacks con-
tinued until the final days of the Bush Administration. 254 Although Hus-
sein declared a "cease-fire" in a friendly gesture towards President-elect
Bill Clinton,255 it was short-lived and the allied attacks continued.2 56
Recently, Clinton has sent U.S. troops and warships to the region to dis-
courage Hussein from his apparent intention to reinvade KIuwait 257
B. The Assassination Attempt
A 1992 study by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) found that,
given the opportunity, Hussein "would seek revenge against those who had
been involved in the decision-making in the war ... and that the area
likely where the danger would be greatest would be in the Middle East."258
His opportunity came on April 14-16, 1993, when former President Bush
visited Kuwait. 259 Bush was accompanied by several family members, a few
246. Iraqi Miscalculation, TIME, Jan. 11, 1993, at 10.
247. Id. at 10; Cheat and Retreat for the Umpteenth Time, supra note 243, at 16; Saddam
Doesn't Get the Message, TIME,Jan. 25, 1993, at 16-17;Jill Smolowe, A Spankingfor Saddam,
TIME, Jan. 25, 1993, at 44.
248. Smolowe, supra note 247, at 46.
249. Cheat and Retreat for the Umpteenth Time, supra note 243, at 16.
250. Saddam Doesn't Get the Message supra note 247, at 16.
251. Smolowe, supra note 247, at 44-45.
252. Saddam Tests the Limits of Victory, TIME, Feb. 1, 1993, at 18.
253. The targets included surface-to-air missile sites, radar and communications facil-
ities, and a nuclear facility. Id.; Smolowe, supra note 247, at 45-46.
254. Smolowe, supra note 247, at 45-46.
255. Bruce W. Nelan, Time to Get Organized, TIME, Feb. 1, 1993, at 49 (quoting Sad-
dam Hussein).
256. See Mark Fineman, US. Attacks Noth Iraq Mhsile Site, LA. TIME,Jail. 23, 1993, at
A4; Saddam Tests the Limits of wtory, supra note 252, at 18. Before taking office, Clinton
stated that he would continue the Bush Administration policy towards Iraq. Thomas L.
Friedman, Clinton Affirms US. Policy on Iraq, N.Y. TImS, Jan. 15, 1993, at Al.
257. See Gibbs, supra note 242, at 34, 36; Richard Corliss, Suddenly, Saddam Again,
TIME, Oct. 17, 1994, at 54.
258. Lany KingLive (CNN television broadcast, May 10, 1993) (quoting former C.I.A.
Director Robert Gates). However, according to Gates, the study "was primarily focused
on those who do not have continuing Secret Service protection, not so much on ...
President [Bush]." Id. But see Iraqi Cites Revenge in Plot to Kill Bush, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 18,
1994, at A17 (quoting Wali al-Ghazali, who had been convicted for his role in the April
1993 plot to kill Bush, as explaining that he wanted revenge against the man who had
"caused harm to 14 million Iraqis" during the Gulf War, including "kill[ing] 16 people
from my family. .. ").
259. Bush, on a Visit to Kuwait, Is Given a Hero's Welcome, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 15, 1993, at
A6.
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Bush Administration officials, and about fifteen Secret Service agents. 260
During the three-day trip, the Kuwaiti government honored Bush for his
role in liberating Kuwait from Iraq during the Gulf War.26 ' Bush was
presented with the Mubarak al-Kabeer, the nation's highest civilian
award, 262 as well as an honorary degree from Kuwait University. 263 In
addition, he addressed the Kuwaiti Parliament, visited war sites, and
reviewed American troops.264 The trip seemed uneventful, and Bush and
his entourage returned safely to the United States.
However, on the day of Bush's arrival, the Kuwaiti government foiled
an assassination plot against the former president.2 65 During and after
the visit, Kuwaiti authorities arrested sixteen Iraqi and Kuwaiti suspects on
charges of conspiracy to kill Bush and commit other terrorist acts.2 6 6
260. Kuwait Jet Carrying Bush Loses Part of Wing Lands, LA TIMEs, Apr. 13, 1993, at
A22.
261. Bush, on a Visit to Kuwait, Is Given a Hero's Welcome, supra note 259, at A6.
262. Id. The medal, which means "Mubarak the Great" in English, is named for the
ruler of Kuwait from 1896-1915, who is revered for his role in Kuwait's independence.
Id.
263. Bush Awarded Kuwait Degree, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at A3.
264. Kuwait's Hero Pays a Vsit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, § 4, at 2.
265. Background Statement on Iraqi/Bush Plot, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, July 5,
1993 [hereinafter Background Statement]. Before the visit, the Kuwaiti government
had discovered evidence of an assassination plot. Yet it did not inform Bush until after
he arrived in Kuwait and the plot was foiled for fear that he would cancel the trip.
Kuwait Didn't Tell Bush of Death Plot Before Visit, HousTON CHRON.,July 4, 1993, at A22;
Douglas Jehl, U.S. Cites Evidence in a Plot on Bush, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1993, § 1, at 9.
Bush may have been in the most danger before he even arrived in Kuwait. The Kuwait
Airways Boeing 747 sent by the Emir to pick up the Bushes in Texas was forced to turn
around and make an emergency landing in Houston because the skin of one of the
wings began to peel away over Louisiana. This delayed the group's departure by one
day. Kuwait Jet Carrying Bush Loses Part of Wing Lands, supra note 260, at A22.
266. Barton Gellman & Ann Devroy, US. Links Iraq to Plot to Assassinate Bush in
Kuwai WASH. Posr, May 8, 1993, at Al. The Kuwaiti trial of fourteen of the suspects
(eleven Iraqis and three Kuwaits) began on June 5, 1993. On the first day of the trial,
the two defendants who had confessed to the F.B.I., see infra text accompanying note
273, pled guilty and testified about the plot. Jonathan C. Randal, Iraqi Testifies He Was
Hired to Kill Bush, WAH. Posr, June 6, 1993, at A29. One of the two later retracted his
confession and pled not guilty. Key Defendant Retracts Confession in Bush Assassination Plot
Tria4 AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
file.
The trial lasted almost exactly one year because of several adjournments. See Events
Leading to Kuwaiti Bush Plot Trial Verdict, Reuters, June 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; Bush Assassin Tria, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6, 1994, at 16. Finally, on June
4, 1994, the Kuwaiti State Security Court sentenced to death five Iraqis and one Kuwaiti
for attempting to assassinate former President Bush. Kuwait Sentences Six to Death for
Plotting to Kill Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1994, § 1, at 6. The court also sentenced seven
Iraqis and Kuwaitis to prison terms ranging from six months to 12 years, and acquitted
one Kuwaiti. Id. On March 20, 1995, the Court of Cassation, Kuwait's highest appellate
court, upheld two of the death sentences, commuted three other death sentences to jail
terms, and acquitted one defendant sentenced to death. Kuwait Politician Wants Security
Court Abolished, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Apr. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File; Death Penalty Upheld in Bush Plot, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1995, at 6; Chronology
of Events Related to Alleged Iraqi Plot Against Bush, REuTEs, Mar. 20, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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According to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, the suspects had planned to
make three attempts on Bush's life if necessary:
first with a remote-controlled car bomb as he arrived at Kuwait City's air-
port; then with a second car bomb near a theater where Bush received an
honorary doctorate; and finally with a suicide attack by a man who planned
to wrap himself in explosives and detonate them next to Bush.26
7
Moreover, Kuwait announced that the plotters were linked to the Iraqi
government.2 6
8
President Clinton sent intelligence teams from the U.S. Secret Ser-
vice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.), and C.IA. to Kuwait to con-
duct an investigation.2 69 On June 24, 1993, the F.B.I. and C.IA reported
to President Clinton that Iraq had planned and directed the operation.
270
The evidence included the following.27 1 Forensics F.B.I. forensics experts
determined that key components of the seized explosives were similar to
devices previously recovered from Iraqi terrorist operations; those compo-
nents had never appeared in the devices used by any other terrorist
group;2 72 Suspects. The F.B.I. interviewed all of the suspects. The two
main suspects, both Iraqi nationals, told the F.B.I. that individuals associ-
ated with the Iraqi Intelligence Service had recruited them, instructed
them, and provided them with the explosives. One suspect stated that he
was recruited specifically to assassinate President Bush, while the other
stated that he was instructed to help transport the car bomb to Kuwait
University and to plant smaller bombs elsewhere in Kuwait;2 73 Intelligence
Assessments During and after the Gulf War, the Iraqi government indi-
cated that it would eventually punish President Bush for the war. The
F.B.I. reported that various classified intelligence sources supported the
conclusion that Iraq had ordered the assassination attempt.
274
C. The U.S. Response
The following day, President Clinton ordered a military strike against
For details on the defendants and their bungled plot, see Mark Fineman, Miscast
Characters Accused of Plot to Kill George Bush, LA TIMES, OCL 30,1993, at Al; SeymourM.
Hersh, A Case Not Closed, NEw YoRKR, Nov. 1, 1993, at 89-92; Inal Ersan, Unheard Evi-
dence Links Iraq to Bush Murder Plot Reuters, June 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curmws File.
267. Gellman & Devroy, supra note 266, at Al.
268. Jehl, supra note 265, § 1, at 9.
269. Id.
270. James Collins, Striking Back, TME, July 5, 1993, at 20, 21.
271. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, later
presented this evidence to the Security Council. SeeU.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3245th mtg.
at 3-9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 (1993) (speech by Madeleine Albright, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations) [hereinafter Albright Speech]. For a detailed
criticism of the evidence, see generally Hersh, A Case Not Closed, supra note 266.
272. See Background Statement supra note 265; Albright Speech, supra note 271, at 4.
273. See Albright Speech, supra note 271, at 5-6.
274. See id. at 6.
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Baghdad.2 75 After reviewing a list of potential targets with his advisors, the
president personally selected the Mukhabarat the Iraqi Intelligence Ser-
vice.2 76 This was the "low end" military option presented to him, attractive
because it was thought to satisfy even the narrowest legal test of self-
defense under Article 51.277 This option was attractive for other reasons
as well: the Mukhabarat was the agency believed to have plotted President
Bush's assassination, 278 its attack posed little risk of heavy civilian casual-
ties,2 79 and its destruction would deter Iraq both in terms of psychology
and operations.2 8 0 For both legal and practical reasons, the Administra-
tion did not seriously consider the idea of trying to kill or harm Hussein
himself.2 8 '
Thus, on Saturday, June 26, 1993, at approximately 4:22 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time (E.S.T.), U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea
fired twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles at the headquarters of the
Mukhabarat, in downtown Baghdad.2 8 2 The missiles landed at about six
p.m. E.S.T., early Sunday morning in Baghdad.2 83 Twenty of the cruise
missiles landed inside the compound, destroying the communications and
computer centers in the "operations wing"284 and nearly destroying the
"leadership wing."28 5 The remaining three missiles struck surrounding
residential neighborhoods, destroying three houses, killing eight people,
275. Hersh, A Case Not Closed, supra note 266, at 80. Initially, the Clinton Administra-
tion had indicated that it was reluctant to take any action before the conclusion of the
Kuwaiti trial. R.Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Links Iraq to Bush Plot, WASH. PosT, June 10, 1993, at
A25. However, after the U.S. action, a State Department spokesman explained: "[The
United States] looked upon this attack on the United States and substantiated the
nature of the threat to the United States and responded accordingly. That's a separate
question from the guilt or innocence of individual parties in Kuwait." State Department
Regular Briefing Fed. News Serv., June 28, 1993 (quoting U.S. State Department spokes-
man Mike McCurry), available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. But seeJohn G.
McCarthy, The United States Should Prosecute Those Who Conspired to Assassinate Former Presi-
dent Bush in Kuwait, 16 FoRDHam INT'L L.J. 1330 (1993) (arguing that the United States
should have extradited the suspects and tried them in the United States).
276. John M. Broder, Hussein Directed Plot to Kill Bush, U.S. Says, LA. TMES, June 29,
1993, at Al. The Mukhabarat is both the security arm and the domestic and foreign
intelligence apparatus of Saddam Hussein's governing Baath Party. Elaine Sciolino,
Clinton Overstates Impact of Raid, His Aides Warn, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at A6.
277. Lancaster & Gellman, supra note 1, at Al.
278. Sciolino, supra note 276, at A6.
279. Broder, supra note 276, at Al.
280. Id.
281. Id. See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
282. Lancaster & Gellman, supra note 1, atAl. The U.S.S. Chancellorsville launched
nine missiles from its position in the Persian Gulf, while the U.S.S. Peterson launched
14 missiles from its position in the Red Sea. Collins, supra note 270, at 21.
283. Gwen Ifill, U.S. Fires Missiles at Baghdad, Citing April Plot to Kill Bush, N.Y. TIMwEs,
June 27, 1993, § 1, at 1.
284. Sciolino, supra note 276, at A6.
285. Lancaster & Gellman, supra note 1, atAl. Four of those twenty missiles missed
their targets but landed inside the compound. Id. The attack did not target or destroy
the other intelligence services used by Saddam Hussein: the Military Intelligence
Agency, the State Internal Security, and Special Security. Thus, U.S. officials conceded
that the main impact of the attack was to disrupt domestic rather than foreign opera-
tions. Sciolino, supra note 276, at A6.
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and wounding at least twelve people.28 6 President Clinton later expressed
his regret for the civilian casualties but emphasized that the attack had
been timed to minimize casualties among workers inside the
compound. 28 7
In a televised address from the Oval Office that same evening, Presi-
dent Clinton told the nation that American investigators had found "com-
pelling evidence" of an Iraqi plot to assassinate former President Bush.28 8
He described the plot as
no impulsive or random act. It was an elaborate plan devised by the Iraqi
Government and directed against a former President of the United States
because of actions he took as President. As such, the Iraqi attack against
President Bush was an attack against our country and against all
Americans.28 9
Throughout the speech, Clinton strongly implied that Saddam Hussein
was personally responsible for the attempt on Bush's life. 290 In his report
to Congress, Clinton explained that he had ordered the military action "in
the exercise of our inherent right of self-defense as recognized in Article
51 of the United Nations Charter and pursuant to my constitutional
authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Coin-
286. Id. The casualties included beloved Iraqi artist Layla Attar. Lara Marlowe, Bro-
ken Spirits, TIME, July 12, 1993, at 46.
287. Lancaster & Gellman, supra note 1, at A13. The missiles hit between 2:00-2:05
a.m. local time, when the facility was expected to be largely deserted. Id. President
Clinton also stressed that "we were trying to avoid killing civilians while still expressing
our convictions about an Iraqi plan.., to blow up a bomb that had a 400-yard radius in
the middle of downtown Kuwait City, which would have killed hundreds and hundreds
of civilians." Id. (quoting President Clinton). However, an unnamed source cited in
The Washington Post (a "person with advance knowledge of the strike") disputed the
Administration's asserted concern about civilian casualties, maintaining that
target planners knew the houses in surrounding residential neighborhoods
were more likely to be occupied in the hours when most people sleep ....
[T]he decision to shoot at night... was based on the low-flying Tomahawk[
missiles'] vulnerability to ground fire when there is enough light for air defense
gunners to aim.
Id. (quoting an unnamed source).
288. President William Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelli-
gence Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. Pimzs. Doc. 1180, 1181 (June 26, 1993) [herein-
after Clinton Speech].
289. Id. at 1181.
290. See id. At a news conference several days later, the President refused to specifi-
cally accuse Hussein, stating only that "the evidence clearly indicates that the bombing
operation was authorized by the Iraqi government... [and American] analysts have no
experience of such an operation of that magnitude being authorized other than at the
highest levels." News Conference with U.S. President Bill Clinton and Argentine President Car-
los Menem, Fed. News Serv., June 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File
(quoting President Clinton). Making the same point as the President, a "senior U.S.
official" stated: "It is inconceivable that an operation like this, conducted by Iraqi intel-
ligence, could have been done without Saddam Hussein [ordering it], because that is
not the way the Iraqi intelligence system and the Iraqi government operate. You can
assume it." Broder, supra note 276, at Al (quoting an unnamed source).
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mander in Chief ... .,,291 On Capitol Hill, the U.S. action generally
received bipartisan support.2 92 In addition, public-opinion polls showed
that Clinton's overall job approval rating had jumped eleven percentage
points after the air strike,293 and that 66% of Americans supported his
decision.2 94
D. The Security Council's Reaction
In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the United States
reported its action to the U.N. Security Council immediately after the
attack.295 The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine
Albright, addressed an emergency session of the Security Council on Sun-
day,June 27, 1993, stating: "I come to the Council today to brief you on a
grave and urgent matter-an attempt to murder a President of the United
States by the intelligence service of the Government of Iraq, a member of
the United Nations."2 96 She presented the evidence linking Iraq to the
assassination attempt,29 7 and stated that the United States had responded
"as we are entitled to do under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
.. "..-298 Albright also emphasized that the United States was not asking
the Security Council to endorse the missile attack or take any other
action.299
Iraq's Ambassador to the United Nations, Nizar Hamdoon, denied
any Iraqi role in the "alleged" assassination attempt.3 0 0 He stated that
"that story was completely fabricated by the Kuwaiti regime for well-known
purposes relating to its policy toward Iraq and with a view to damaging
and harming [Iraqi." 3 01 He accused the United States of trying, convict-
ing, and sentencing Iraq without evidence,3 02 thus violating international
law and its responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Coun-
291. War Powers Resolution Letter, supra note 3, at 1183. See also U.N. Doc. S/26003
(1993) (letter from Madeleine Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations) [hereinafter Albright Letter].
292. Gaylord Shaw, Hit on Iraqi Center Succegfui U.S. Says, But Civilians Killed, NEws.
DAY, June 28, 1993, at 3. See also Remarks By Congressional Leadership Following Their Meet-
ing With President Clinton, Reuter Transcript Rep., June 30, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File. But see Lancaster & Gellman, supra note 1, at Al, A13 (quot-
ing Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-CA)).
293. Lori Santos, Clinton Won't Point Finger at Saddam, U.P.I.,June 30, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
294. Clinton: Iraqi Intelligence Crippled, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, June 29, 1993, at A8
(citing a USA TodayGNN Gallup poll). Interestingly, 54% of those polled also believed
that the attack would increase the risk of terrorism in the United States, and 53%
favored assassinating Saddam Hussein. Id.
295. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See Albright Letter, supra note 291.
296. Albright Speech, supra note 271, at 3.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 272-74.
298. Albright Speech, supra note 271, at 6.
299. Id. at 3.
300. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245, at 9-13 (1993) (speech by Nizar Hamdoon, Iraqi Per-
manent Representative to the United Nations).
301. Id. at 11.
302. Id.
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cil.30 3 Therefore, Hamdoon urged the Security Council to condemn the
U.S. action.a0 4 The Security Council ignored his request; instead of pass-
ingjudgment on the incident, the body just acknowledged the U.S. expla-
nation and evidence.30 5
V. Analysis of the U.S. Response
Realistically, the Security Council could not have satisfied the Iraqi ambas-
sador's demands, as the United States could have simply exercised its veto
over any adverse resolution.3 06 Yet the United States did not even have to
do that, as the Security Council did little more than hear its arguments
and adjourn. 3 0 7 The General Assembly also took no action. Thus, the
United Nations appears to have failed in its duty to scrutinize the U.S.
action to determine whether it really was a legitimate act of self-defense.
The United Nations apparently forgot the declaration by the Nuremberg
303. Id. at 12.
304. Id. at 13.
305. Stanley Meisler, U.N. Reaction Mild as U.S. Explains Raid, LA. TIMES, June 28,
1993, at Al. See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245, at 25 (1993) (statement byYafiez Barnuevo,
Spanish Permanent Representative to the United Nations and then-President of the
Security Council); Stephen Robinson, U.N. Support for Raid on Baghdad, Daily Tele-
graph, June 28, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
Inside and outside of the United Nations, world public opinion divided along
expected lines. America's European allies unanimously supported the U.S. attack. See
Craig R. Whitney, European Allies Are Giving Strong Backing to U.S. Raid, N.Y. TimIs, June
28, 1993, at A7. See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245, at 13-15 (1993) (statement byJean-Ber-
nard Merimee, French Permanent Representative to the United Nations); id. at 21-22
(statement by Sir David Hannay, British Permanent Representative to the United
Nations). Russia, Japan, and South Korea also backed the action. See id. at 16 (state-
ment by Yoshio Hatano,Japanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations); id.
at 22-23 (statement byYuli Vorontsov, Russian Permanent Representative to the United
Nations); Paul Holmes, Concern in China, Misgivings in Europe, Reuters, June 28, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
Most Arab countries criticized the strike, charging that American inaction towards
the plight of Bosnian Muslims and Palestinians living under Israeli occupation provided
evidence of "double standards." Arab Nations See a Double Standard, LA TIMEs,June 28,
1993, at A8. Kuwait and Turkey were the only Islamic states publicly supporting the
United States. Konstantin Eggert & Maksin Yusin, U.S. Strike on Baghdad Draws Mixed
Reviews, Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, July 28, 1993, at 13, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File. China also criticized the attack, the only permanent mem-
ber of the Security Council to do so. Holmes, supra. See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245, at 21
(1993) (statement by Li Zhaoxing, Chinese Permanent Representative to the United
Nations).
A few days after the emergency Security Council meeting, U.N. Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali refused to reveal his opinion on whether or not the U.S. action
was justified under Article 51. He first replied, "You have to ask this question to the
American administration." When pressed further, he simply stated, "I will not give you
an answer." Boutros-Ghali Steers Clear of Iraq Controversy, Reuters, July 1, 1993 (quoting
Boutros-Ghali), available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
306. See supra part III.B.3. Interestingly, the three Islamic countries on the Security
Council (Pakistan, Morocco, and Djibouti) acknowledged their concern but did not
defend Iraq. Robinson, supra note 305, at 1. See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245, at 16-17
(statement byJose Eduardo Barbosa, Cape Verde Deputy Permanent Representative to
the United Nations).
307. See discussion supra text accompanying note 305.
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Tribunal that "whether action taken under the claim of self-defense was in
fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and
adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced."3 0 8 This part of
the Note will investigate whether or not the U.S. missile attack on Baghdad
was justified as an act of national self-defense under international law.30 9
A. Under Customary International Law
In the first step of the analysis, the U.S. response must be measured
against the standards of customary international law.31 0 During the Caro-
line incident, 311 U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined the
requirements necessary for a valid claim of self-defense under customary
international law.3 12 First, there must be an imminent threat, a threat
which is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."313 Second, the response must be necessary to
protect against that threat.3 14 Third, the response must be proportionate
to the threat; it must be "limited by that necessity and kept clearly within
it" and cannot be "unreasonable or excessive .... ,3 15 Finally, the victim
state must have taken the self-defensive action as a last resort. It must have
tried to resolve the crisis through peaceful means or at least show that
such an attempt "was impracticable" or "would have been unavailing
... "316 These four requirements will be considered in turn.
1. Imminent Threat
The hardest question is whether the assassination attempt against former
President Bush constituted an imminent threat to the United States. First,
was it a threat to the United States at all? In his address to the nation,
President Clinton argued that it was a threat against the United States and
all Americans.3 17 According to Clinton, the attempt was such a threat
308. NurembergJudgment, supra note 30, at 38.
309. For the purpose of analyzing the legality of the U.S. action, this Note assumes
that the U.S. account of the assassination attempt, see supra part IV.B, is true and
accurate.
310. The author agrees with those who argue that the U.N. Charter modifies, but
does not completely supersede, customary international law. See discussion supra part
lilA The language of the Charter seems to compel this conclusion. Article 51 states in
part that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
... self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. .. "
U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added). Thus, the proper framework for analyzing the
legality of a claim of national self-defense seems to be the following: analyze the action
according to customary international law (as expressed in the four-part Caroline stan-
dard, see supra text accompanying note 60), and then consider what is essentially the
fifth condition for the use of force in self-defense, the Charter's requirement of an
"armed attack."
311. See discussion supra part IIA





317. Clinton Speech, supra note 288, at 1181. In fact, he called it "an attack against
our country and against all Americans." Id. (emphasis added). See alsoAlbright Speech,
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because it was "directed against a former President of the United States
because of actions he took as President," particularly in leading the inter-
national coalition that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War.3 18 President Clin-
ton was correct. An assassination or attempted assassination against a
current head of state poses a threat to his or her entire nation. It has a
variety of potential effects, each of which is destabilizing: changes in the
nation's leadership,3 19 shifts in national policy,3 20 systemic changes in the
nation's political system,32 ' social or economic revolution,3 22 changes in
the personal behavior patterns of political leaders,3 23 and a rise in the
general anxiety level of the populace.3 24
The international community was certainly concerned about those
possibilities when it established rules of warfare which are generally
assumed to prohibit assassination.3 2 5 Moreover, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents specifically addresses the topic of
assassination, the only major multilateral treaty to do so. 3 2 6 The Conven-
tion requires the signatory states to criminalize the murder of and other
violent actions against "internationally protected persons."3 27 The cate-
supra note 271 ("[E]very member here today would regard an assassination attempt
against its former head of state as an attack against itself ...
318. Clinton Speech, supra note 288, at 1181.
319. MuRRAY C. HAvENs Er AL., THE PoLrrcs OF ASSASSINATION 37 (1970).
320. Id. at 38. The authors explain:
Policy may change because the victim was its most eminent and vocal supporter
and there are few left to give it the energetic support it needs. But policy may
also change because the assassination represents in the minds of the survivors a
discrediting of the old policy. It may change as well when the succeeding
regime uses the assassination as an excuse to embark on new policies that the
victim himself would have endorsed had he lived. Indeed, his assassination may
provide the moral authority without which his goals could not have been
achieved at all.
Id
321. Id. at 38. Such systemic changes might include the abolition of political parties,
the restriction of civil liberties, and the promotion of new ideologies. Id.
322. Id. at 39.
323. Id. at 34.
324. Murray Edelman & Rita James Simon, Presidential Assassinations: Their Meaning
and Impact on American Society, in ASSASSINATIONS AND THE POLxiCAL ORDER 455, 461
(WilliamJ. Crotty ed., 1971).
325. See Hague IV Convention, supra note 8, art. 23(b); Protocol I, supra note 237,
art. 37. See also U.N. CHARTm art. 4, 2.
326. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter New York Convention]. Both Iraq and the United
States are signatories to the Convention. See New York Convention, supra, 28 U.S.T. at
2043, 1035 U.N.T.S. at 209 (signature of Iraq); New York Convention, supra, 28 U.S.T.
at 2069, 1035 U.N.T.S. at 225 (signature of the United States).
The Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU.) also condemns the use of
political assassination by OAU. members. OAU. CHARTER art. 3, 5. Yet, as one
scholar remarked, "the ongoing violence that plagues the African continent suggests
that the provision is more hortatory than substantive." Schmitt, supra note 224, at 618.
327. NewYork Convention, supra note 326, art. 2, 1-2. The NewYork Convention
only requires the signatory states to enact domestic legislation criminalizing such
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gory of protected individuals includes heads of state and their families, but
only when they are in a foreign state. 328 Thus, if the assassination attempt
had occurred while Bush was still president, Iraq clearly would have vio-
lated the spirit of this Convention. A distinction should not be made
merely because the attempt was made after Bush left office; the spirit of
the Convention was violated, and many of the same destabilizing effects
could still have occurred.32 9
The plot to kill former President Bush was therefore a threat to the
United States, but was that threat "instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation"?3 3 0 On first thought,
one might respond in the negative. After all, the Kuwaiti government
foiled the plot before Bush was in any danger of harm.3 31 Kuwaiti authori-
ties arrested sixteen suspects3 32 and left their fates to the legal system. 3 3 3
The plot was thus unsuccessful. However, nothing prevented Iraq from
directing a second-possibly successful-attempt on Bush's life.33 4 Thus,
the possibility of another assassination plot was "hanging threateningly
over [Bush's] head"33 5 and was therefore imminent. By attacking the
Iraqi Intelligence Service, the United States hoped to prevent and deter
future attempts to kill Bush. 33 6
action; it does not treat acts such as assassination as a violation of international law.
Schmitt, supra note 224, at 619.
328. New York Convention, supra note 326, art. 1, 1 1(a).
329. The fact that former presidents and their families are protected by the U.S.
Secret Service and that threats against them receive special criminal treatment evi-
dences a similar concern by U.S. domestic law. See 18 U.S.C. § 879 (1988).
330. Document 99, supra note 57, at 159.
331. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
333. See id.
334. Bush's Houston neighbors were certainly concerned about the possibility of a
second assassination attempt, even after the U.S. missile attack on Baghdad. See Bill
Hewitt, Having a Great Time, Thanks, PEOPLE, July 19, 1993, at 38, 40.
335. WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGATE DICTIONARY 568 (1979) (defining "imminent").
336. SeeClinton Speech, supranote 288, at 1182. Although some readers may choose
to view this justification as one of "anticipatory self-defense," see supra note 66 and
accompanying text, they should recognize that such ajustification by its terms presup-
poses that no actual attack against the victim state had yet occurred. See Oscar
Schachter, TheRight of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1620, 1638 (1984). As
discussed infra parts V.B.1.-2., an attack had in fact occurred.
Other readers may view the American action not as self-defense at all, but as a repri-
sal. Like actions taken in self-defense, reprisals are a form of national self-help; unlike
actions taken in self-defense, reprisals are illegal under international law. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, 4 (proscribing "the threat or use of force"); Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, G.A. Res.
2624, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) ("States
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."). The difference
between self-defense and reprisals is in their purpose:
Self-defense is permissible for the purpose of protecting the security of the state
and the essential rights-in particular the rights of territorial integrity and
political independence- upon which that security depends. In contrast, repri-
sals are punitive in character they seek to impose reparation for the harm
done, or to compel a satisfactory settlement of the dispute created by the initial
illegal act, or to compel the delinquent state to abide by the law in the future.
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2. Necessity
The second consideration under customary international law is whether
the U.S. action was necessary to protect against the threat.337 Because the
threat was imminent, the United States needed to act quickly to remove it.
Once the United States had compelling evidence of Iraq's involvement in
the assassination plot, President Clinton ordered immediate action. By
directly targeting the Iraqi agency believed to have plotted the assassina-
tion attempt,338 Clinton reduced the possibility of a second attempt on
Bush's life before the United States could publicize the details of Iraq's
plan to kill the former president. Moreover, the military action was neces-
sary partly because history had shown that diplomacy and other non-mili-
tary means would likely fail to induce Hussein to change his behavior.339
President Clinton also argued that the attack was necessary "to protect our
sovereignty; to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored ter-
rorism; to deter future violence against our people; and to affirm the
expectation of civilized behavior among nations. '340
3. Proportionality
The requirement of proportionality "is linked closely to necessity in
requiring that a use of force in self-defense must not exceed in manner or
aim the necessity provoking it."3 4 1 The United States rightfully argued
that the attack was proportional to the threat.342 Actually, a perfectly pro-
portionate response would have been an attempt to kill Saddam Hus-
But, coming after the event and when the harm has already been inflicted,
reprisals cannot be characterized as a means of protection.
Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1972).
See also HiLAnRE McCouBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CON-
rLIcr 112 (1992). As stated in the text, the U.S. action was an act of self-defense since
the threat to Bush and the United States was ongoing. Yet admittedly there is a fine
line between self-defense and reprisals in a situation such as this, since "the dividing
line between protection and retribution becomes more and more obscure as one moves
away from the particular incident and examines the whole context in which the two or
more acts of violence have occurred." Bowett, supra, at 3. As Bowett explains:
Indeed, within the whole context of a continuing state of antagonism between
states, with recurring acts of violence, an act of reprisal may be regarded as
being at the same time both a form of punishment and the best form of protec-
tion for the future, since it may act as a deterrent against future acts of violence
by the other party.
Id. See also William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Opera-
tions, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 476 (1990) (arguing that the right of self-defense should
include both on-the-spot reactions and defensive reprisals to terrorist attacks). But see
John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on Iraq's Intelli-
gence Headquarters, HASTNGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rv. 241 (1994) (arguing that the U.S.
action constituted an illegal act of reprisal).
337. Document 99, supra note 57, at 159.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 275-78.
339. See infra part V.A4.
340. Clinton Speech, supra note 288, at 1181.
341. Rogoff & Collins, supra note 39, at 498.
342. See Clinton Speech, supra note 288, at 1181; Albright Speech, supra note 271, at
5.
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sein,mS but such action would violate both domestic and international
law.344 Instead, President Clinton chose a "firm and commensurate
response,"345 specifically rejecting the broader use of military force.3 46
The target selected, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, had been directly
involved with planning and directing the assassination plot.3 47 Since the
threat was imminent and a military response was necessary only to the
extent that Iraq had the means to order and direct a future attempt, the
United States properly limited the scope of its response. In addition, Clin-
ton claimed that he timed the attack so as to minimize the number of
civilian casualties. 348
4. Exhaustion of Peaceful Means
The final consideration under the Caroline standard is whether the action
was taken as a last resort in protecting against the threat.3 49 Webster
stated that this condition is satisfied if the victim state attempted to resolve
the crisis through peaceful means, or if the victim state could later show
that such an attempt was impracticable or unlikely to succeed.35 0 Presi-
dent Clinton emphasized his judgment that other alternatives would have
been futile: "Based on the Government of Iraq's pattern of disregard for
international law, I concluded that there was not reasonable prospect that
new diplomatic initiatives or economic measures could influence the cur-
rent Government of Iraq to cease planning future attacks against the
United States."3 5 1 Ambassador Albright made the same point in her pres-
entation to the Security Council.3 52 Since Iraq was still refusing to comply
fully with the terms of the two-year old Gulf War cease-fire, 53 the United
States could reasonably assume that a peaceful attempt to reduce the
imminent threat would fail. In addition, Iraq initially denied any involve-
ment in the plan.3 54 Therefore, the U.S. response satisfies the standard
343. Cf Paul D. Wolfowitz, Clinton's First Year, FOREIGN As.,Jan./Feb. 1994, at 28, 35
(stating that the military effect of the U.S. attack "was negligible, hardly proportionate
to the enormity of what the Iraqis [had] tried to do."). But cf. Court Sentences Man to 40
Years for Trying to Kill the Presiden N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1995, at A1O (reporting that
Judge Charles Richey of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia sen-
tenced Francisco Martin Duran to 40 years in prison after Duran was convicted of the
attempted assassination of President Clinton and related crimes).
344. See supra part IVA2.
345. Clinton Speech, supra note 288, at 1182.
346. Lancaster & Gellman, supra note 1, at Al.
347. See Sciolino, supra note 276, at A6.
348. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
349. Document 99, supra note 57, at 159.
350. Id.
351. War Powers Resolution Letter, supra note 2, at 1183. See also Clinton Speech,
supra note 288, at 1181 ("The world has repeatedly made clear what Iraq must do to
return to the community of nations. And Iraq has repeatedly refused.").
352. See Albright Speech, supra note 271, at 6. See also Albright Letter, supra note
291.
353. See supra note 223 and part IVA3.
354. Hersh, supra note 266, at 90.
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under customary international law for the legitimate use of force in self-
defense.
B. Under Article 51: "Armed Attack"
The second step in the analysis is to consider further the legitimacy of the
U.S. response to the extent that Article 51 modifies customary interna-
tional law.355 Article 51 states that the U.N. Charter does not impair "the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member .... ,"356 Thus, the Charter essentially adds a fifth
condition to the use of force in self-defense-a victim state's retaliatory
action must be in response to an imminent threat, necessary, taken after
the exhaustion of peaceful means, proportionate, and, finally, pursuant to
an armed attack.3 57 Thus, the key question is whether the Iraqi attempt to
kill former President Bush constituted an "armed attack" on the United
States.
The U.N. Charter does not define the term "armed attack."3 5 8 The
United Nations has consistently interpreted the term to mean only a direct
physical invasion by one state into the territory of another.35 9 Using this
interpretation of Article 51, one could argue that the unsuccessful Iraqi
plot to kill Bush while he was visiting Kuwait did not rise to the level of an
armed attack. Yet there are three different responses to such an argu-
ment. First, the Iraqi plot did constitute an armed attack consistent with
the restrictive interpretation of Article 51.360 Second, the plot constituted
an armed attack consistent with a broad interpretation of Article 51.361
Finally, even if the plot did not constitute an armed attack, the U.S.
response was nevertheless legitimate.
3 6 2
1. The Restrictive Interpretation
Article 51 provides for the right of self-defense "if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations .... ,3 63 The proponents of the
restrictive view have used this language to argue that the right of self-
defense is only triggered upon a full-scale invasion into the territory of the
victim state. 36 However, such a linguistic argument fails on its own terms;
while the Charter's language requires an "armed attack," it does not
require a "direct armed attack."3 65 Thus, the drafters of Article 51 appear
355. See discussion supra part IIA.
356. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
357. However, recall that some scholars do not believe that an "armed attack" is a
prerequisite to the legitimate use of force in self-defense. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 85,
at 94. The author agrees with those who argue for a broad interpretation of "armed
attack." See supra text accompanying notes 95-102.
358. See Elliot, supra note 38, at 66.
359. See Schachter, supra note 103, at 263-64.
360. See discussion infra part V.B.1.
361. See discussion infra part V.B.2.
362. See discussion infra part V.B.3.
363. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
364. See, e.g., JEssuP, supra note 86, at 166.
365. Baker, supra note 94, at 41.
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to have "intended to cover all modes of attack as long as it was armed. '3 6 6
Under this reasoning, the Iraqi attempt to kill former President Bush cer-
tainly qualifies as an "armed attack." The suspects entered Kuwait with the
intention of detonating three bombs,3 67 one of which had a lethal radius
of 400 yards,3 68 in order to accomplish their objective. The explosion of
any one of these bombs could have killed not only Bush but also hundreds
of civilians.3 6 9 The fact that the attack occurred in Kuwait does not affect
the nature of this attack on the United States;37 0 it shows only that Iraq
violated the sovereignty of two countries, rather than just one.
2. The Broad Interpretation
Furthermore, a restrictive interpretation of "armed attack" may have
included most forms of international agression when the Charter was
adopted in 1946, but it is neither politically nor technologically realistic
today. In the 1990s, an "armed attack" can be accomplished through a
variety of means other than a traditional land invasion. Such other means
include nuclear weapons, biological and chemical agents, and acts of ter-
rorism.3 7 ' Unless the United Nations takes a more contemporary view of
the event that triggers a justified use of force in self-defense, nations may
simply decide that international law cannot deal competently with this
issue. Yet the international community cannot afford the dangerous conse-
quences of that possibility, in which nations would use military force
against any threat to their national self-interest, regardless of whether or
not the threat arguably rises to the level of an "armed attack" in the mod-
em sense. In order to maintain control over the use of force, the United
Nations must adapt the standard for self-defense to a changing world.
The United Nations can do so on its own terms. It could interpret the
requirement of an "armed attack," which is not authoritatively defined, as
coterminous with "aggression," which is so defined.3 72 In 1975, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted a formal "Definition of Aggression. 3 73 The
Assembly was
[c]onvinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have
the effect of deterring a potential aggressor, would simplify the determina-
tion of acts of aggression and the implementation of measures to suppress
them and would also facilitate the protection of the rights and lawful inter-
366. Id.
367. See supra text accompanying note 267.
368. Albright Speech, supra note 271, at 4.
369. Id.
370. See discussion supra part V.A.1.
371. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
372. SeeJohn Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of
Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM.J. IN'r'L L. 135, 139 n.15 (1987); Turndorf, supra note 95, at
197-99, 218-19.
373. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
Vol 28
1995 Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously
ests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the victim .... 374
The General Assembly defined "aggression" as "the use of armed force by
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition."3 75 The Defi-
nition also provides that the first use of armed force in violation of the
Charter is prima facie evidence of an act of aggression.3 76
The Definition lists a variety of state actions qualifying as acts of
aggression against another state, including: invading, occupying, or annex-
ing the territory of another state;377 using any kind of weapon to attack
the territory of another state;3 78 blockading the ports or coasts of another
state;3 79 attacking the armed forces of another state;3 80 using armed forces
in another state beyond the scope of a prior agreement between the two
states;3 81 allowing its territory to be used by a third state to commit acts of
aggression against another state;38 2 and sending armed groups to attack
another state.3 8 3 The Definition explains that this list is not exhaustive.
3 8 4
By using this broad Definition, the United Nations could find that the
Iraqi attempt to kill former President Bush was an "armed attack" trigger-
ing the right of self-defense. The attempt meets the basic definition of
"aggression," since it was the use of "armed force" against the "sovereignty
... of another State ... or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter."38 5 Specifically, the attempt was inconsistent with the prohibi-
tion on the use of force contained in Article 2.386 Even though the plot
did not succeed, it would still be "aggression" under the broad Definition
since Article 2 prohibits not only the use of force but also the threat of
such use.3 8 7 Moreover, an assassination attempt like that against former
President Bush is described in the last example cited in the Definition:
"[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregu-
lars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another
374. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Annex, GA Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) [hereinafter Definition of
Aggreasion].
375. Id. art. 1.
376. Id. art. 2. However, the Security Council may "conclude that a determination
that an act of aggression has been committed would not bejustified in the light of other
relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their conse-
quences are not of sufficient gravity." Id.
377. Id. art. 3(a).
378. Id. art. 3(b). This provision presumably refers to attacks that a state can launch
against the territory of another state without actually invading, such as air, missile, and
nuclear attacks.
379. Id. art. 3(c).
380. Id. art. 3(d).
381. Id. art. 3(e)
382. Id. art. 3(f).
383. Id. art. 3(g).
384. Id. art 4.
385. Id. art. 1.
386. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 14.
387. Id. See also Bowrr, supra note 66, at 191.
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State ... .-"388 Thus, the application of the Definition of Aggression to
Article 51 would justify the U.S. response as legitimate self-defense.
3. "Proportionate Counter-measures"
The Definition of Aggression also states:
The first use of armed force by a state in contravention of the Charter shall
constitute primafacie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security
Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determina-
tion that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in
the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts
concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity. 389
In other words, even if the U.S. action did not satisfy all of the conditions
for legitimate self-defense and was itself an act of aggression, it may never-
theless be legal under international law. The International Court of Jus-
tice recently followed a similar approach in the context of collective self-
defense. In a suit brought by Nicaragua against the United States, the
Court held that the conduct of the United States in "training, arming,
equipping, financing and supplying the Contra forces or otherwise
encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in
and around Nicaragua" violated the Charter's prohibition on the use of
force.3 90 The Court rejected the U.S. self-defense argument that Nicara-
gua's provision of arms391 and logistical support to the rebels in El Salva-
dor3 92 and military incursions into Honduran and Costa Rican territory3 93
constituted an "armed attack."394 The Court added that even if such
actions by Nicaragua had risen to the level of an armed attack, they would
have justified a response only by the victim states, not by the United
States. 395
In the course of its decision, the Court acknowledged that activities
which do not constitute an armed attack may nevertheless "constitute a
breach of the principle of the non-use of force.., that is, a form of con-
duct which is certainly wrongful, but is of lesser gravity than an armed
attack."3 9 6 The Court suggested that such lesser uses of force may justify
"proportionate counter-measures" by the victim state.3 9 7 This reasoning
388. Definition of Aggression, supra note 374, art. 3(g).
389. Id. art. 2.
390. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 94, paras. 238, 292, 25 I.L.M. at 1078, 1089-90. See
also Paul Lewis, World Court Supports Nicaragua After U.S. RejectedJudges' Role, N.Y. TIMs,
June 28, 1986, § 1, at 1. The United States rejected this decision. Id. The United States
had argued earlier that only the U.N. Security Council had jurisdiction to decide cases
involving ongoing armed conflicts. See Counter-Memorial of the United States of
America (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. Pleadings 1, 221 (Aug. 17).
391. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.CJ. 94, paras. 195, 247, 25 I.L.M. at 1068, 1079-80.
392. Id. paras. 194-95, 247, 25 I.L.M. at 1068, 1079-80.
393. Id. paras. 164, 231, 238, 25 I.L.M. at 1060, 1076, 1078.
394. Id. paras. 160, 238, 249, 25 I.L.M. at 1059, 1078, 1080.
395. Id. para. 249, 25 I.L.M. at 1080.
396. Id. para. 247, 25 I.L.M. at 1079-80.
397. Id. para. 249, 25 I.L.M. at 1080. See also Sofaer, supra note 85, at 94; Hargrove,
supra note 372, at 138. The Court stated:
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clearly applies to the case at hand. Even if the Iraqi plot to kill former
President Bush was not an "armed attack" in the sense of creating a right
of self-defense under Article 51, it was a breach of the general prohibition
on the use of force declared by Article 2(4). Thus, even if the United
States would not have been permitted to respond with force in self-
defense, it was nevertheless justified in responding with "proportionate
counter-measures." 3 98 Since the U.S. missile attack on the Iraqi Intelli-
gence Service was a "proportionate counter-measure,"3 99 the attack was
legal under international law.
Conclusion
The U.S. missile attack on Baghdad was legal under international law.
The response satisfied the requirements for the legitimate use of force in
self-defense under customary international law, since the U.S. action was
necessary, in response to an imminent threat, proportionate, and taken
after the exhaustion of peaceful means. The U.S. action also satisfied the
additional condition imposed by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
requires that the action be taken in response to an "armed attack." Even if
the U.S. action did not satisfy these conditions, it was legal nonetheless as
a "proportionate counter-measure." The United Nations must expand its
notion of what constitutes justified self-defensive action, or else it will lose
its authority in this area through increasing use of the Great Power Veto.
Yet the United States did not have to exercise its veto in this case, unlike
after its actions against Libya and Panama. The fact that the United
Nations did not even consider condemning the U.S. response may have
been a tacit acknowledgement by the organization that the United States
did not violate international law in forcefully responding to the Iraqi plot
to kill George Bush.
While an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective self-
defence [sic], a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity cannot... produce any
entitlement to take collective counter-measures involving the use of force. The
acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to have been estab-
lished and imputable to that State, could only have justified proportionate counter-
measures on the part of the State which had been the victim of these acts, namely El
Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica. They could not justify counter-measures
taken by a third State, the United States, and particularly could notjustify inter-
vention involving the use of force.
Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.G.J. 94, para. 249, 25 I.L.M. at 1080, (emphasis added). The
Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the victim state's "proportionate counter-
measures" may include the use of force. See id. para. 210, 25 I.L.M. at 1071. However, a
victim state's counter-measure that includes the use of force would seem to be propor-
tionate to an attack that involved force.
398. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.G.J. 94, para. 210, 25 I.L.M. at 1071.
399. See discussion supra part V.A.3.

